The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
ChristopherAveryt
ChristineJollstt
RichardA. Posnerttt
Alvin E. Rothtttt
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ............................................................................................
I. A Normative Framework ..............................................................
A. Disillusionment with the Federal Bench .............................
B. E fficiency .................................................................................
1.

Pareto efficiency. ............................................................

2.

Maximizing the "sum total of satisfaction"
of judges and clerks ........................................................

794
798
798
799
800
800

3. Maximizing the "production of justice....................... 804
C. Perceived Fairness ..................................................................
805
II.

E mpirical Results ...........................................................................
A. A Brief History of the Law Clerk Market ...........................
B. Survey Design and Response ................................................

1.
2.
3.
C.

f

Survey of Supreme Court Justices ................................
Surveys of court of appeals judges ...............................
Surveys of students .........................................................

805
805
807

807
807
808

Is the Law Clerk Market Functioning Well? ....................... 812

1.

Efficiency: Maximizing the "sum of satisfaction" of
judges and clerks with the match .................................. 813

2.

Disillusionment with the federal bench .......................

834

3.

Perceived fairness ...........................................................

840

Associate Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law, The
University of Chicago.
tttt
Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Harvard University.
Thanks to Stuart Buck, Brian Fitzpatrick, Howell Jackson, Anne Joseph, Louis Kaplow, Lewis Kornhauser, Mark Lemley, Renee Lettow, Daniel Meltzer, Robert Mnookin, Elliott
Peranson, Eric Posner, Fred Schauer, Margo Schlanger, Gil Seinfeld, Cass Sunstein, Jonathan Zittrain, and participants in law and economics workshops at Harvard Law School, Stanford Law
School, the University of Chicago Law School, and the University of Michigan Law School, as
well as participants in the Harvard Law School Economics of Courts Conference and the National Bureau of Economic Research Spring 2000 Labor Studies Meeting, for helpful suggestions
and comments. We also acknowledge the generous assistance of Ian Ayres, Michael Doff, Kathleen Sullivan, Cass Sunstein, Kent Syverud, and Christine Whitman with the distribution of student surveys and the helpful research assistance of Gabrielle Stebbins.

tt
ttt

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:793

III. The Experience of Other Markets ............................................... 845
A. A Framework: Four Stages of Unraveling Markets ........... 848
850
B. Vignettes .................................................................................
850
1. M edical residencies ........................................................
851
2. Postseason college bowls ...............................................
3. Clinical psychology positions ........................................ 853
4. Japanese university graduates ....................................... 854
5. Canadian articling positions .......................................... 855
858
6. Medical residencies (again) ..........................................
IV. Three Decreasingly Modest Proposals for Governing
the Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks -and How
Their Chances of Success Can Be Made Less Bleak .................. 859
A. The "Do Nothing" Approach: A Decentralized
Market in Which Participants Are Free to Act
859
A s They Wish ...........................................................................
861
1. P rognosis .........................................................................
861
2. P alliatives ........................................................................
B. If at First You Don't Succeed, Try Again:
862
Set Start D ates ........................................................................
863
1. Prognosis .....................................
866
2. Palliatives ........................................................................
C. The "Monkey See, Monkey Do" Approach: Adopt the
Medical Matching System As Is ........................................... 868
869
1. P rognosis .....................................
871
2. P alliatives ........................................................................
871
D. A Modified Medical Match ...................................................
1. Solving the problem of informal agreements .............. 871
2. The scope of the centralized process ............................ 872
3. Attributes of a centralized process ............................... 877
4. Transition and administrative issues ............................ 882
5. Trouble signs in a modified match ................................ 882
884
C onclusion ...............................................................................................
886
D ata A ppendix .......................................................................................
INTRODUCTION

In September of 1998 the Judicial Conference abandoned its
most recent attempt to regulate the timing of interviews and offers in
the process for hiring federal judicial law clerks. In September of 1999
most prominent law schools abandoned or cut back their attempts to
regulate the time at which faculty recommendation letters could be
sent. Thus, the law clerk hiring process now gets underway at the beginning of the second year of law school, roughly two years before the
clerkship positions themselves would begin.
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What is going on here, and what, if anything, should be done
about it? To answer the first question, we present a wide range of new
and systematic empirical data from judges and students about their
experiences in the market for federal judicial law clerks, and we show
how the problems of this market resemble problems in a broad set of
other markets in the economy. To answer the second question, about
possible reform of the law clerk market, we describe some of the
unique features of this market that make reform particularly challenging and consider whether there are ways to adapt the reforms that
have succeeded in other markets to these unique features.
Federal judicial clerkships represent an important point of entry
to many of the most sought-after positions in the legal profession.
Every year top students from elite law schools compete for positions
with judges who can help them to land Supreme Court clerkships,
plum teaching jobs, and competitive law firm positions.' At the same
time, federal judges depend heavily on their law clerks to aid them
with their workload
The essential problem with how this important market presently
functions is that it is difficult to establish the time at which the market
will operate. Any time that is set will tend to "unravel" because judges
have an incentive to "jump the gun," hiring slightly earlier than their
competitors, to get the pick of the candidates.3 Students have strong
reasons to accept early offers from judges, among other things because
they will not know what their other options may be, and also because
it is, quite simply, difficult and uncomfortable to hold off a federal
judge. Judge Kozinski explains the incentive on the judge side: "From
the judge's perspective, making an early offer allows him to ...attract

candidates who might not otherwise seriously consider him for a
clerkship." "[T]he ability to make offers early" is "a very important
bargaining tool."' As described by one respondent to our survey of
federal appellate judges:
I live in, and my office is located in, a country town ....
[I]t is not

every young man or woman who will come here to live; indeed,
most won't....

[Initially] I did not employ law clerks until they had finished the
first term of their senior year of law school.... I soon found out
See generally Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a BadApple, 100 Yale L J 1707,1709 (1991)
(describing judges' influence over clerks' future career trajectories).
2
See Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 Mich L Rev 152,153 (1990) (describing the
effects of clerk quality on judges' productivity).
3 See Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun:Imperfections and InstitutionsRelated to the Timing of Market Transactions,84 Am Econ Rev 992,992 (1994).
4 Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1720 (cited in note 1).
5 Id at 1719.
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that it was more and more difficult to get law clerks from the top
of the class.... But I have found that there are a few people in
the top of the class at most law schools who had rather be assured of a job early, even in a town this size, than to wait and enter the contest in becoming clerks for judges in the larger cities
with the larger and better-advertised reputations.
The result of this incentive for jumping the gun is a situation in
which judges scheme to outmaneuver one another in the effort to hire
desirable clerks. Judges accuse their colleagues of "frequenting maternity wards to make sure they get the 'best' clerks."7 The frenzy of hiring has cast the judiciary into disrepute in some eyes-a concern that
judges have often voiced over the years, and a concern that is dramatically confirmed by some of the striking stories told by students in response to our empirical investigation. The process by which clerks are
hired has other negative consequences as well, as we describe below.
Part I of our analysis provides a normative framework within
which to analyze the market for federal judicial law clerks. There is a
complicated economics literature on the efficiency of hiring in markets with timing problems; we attempt to distill the essential components of this literature, which have not been well understood in the existing legal literature on the law clerk market, and we highlight some
special features of the economics literature that bear on law clerk hiring specifically. Our normative framework provides a context within
which to view our empirical results.
A fundamental goal of our project has been to gain an improved
understanding of how the market for federal judicial law clerks actually operates. There are many rumors and opinions about this market,
and few hard facts. To remedy the lack of systematic knowledge, we
have surveyed both judges (including Supreme Court Justices) and
students about the law clerk hiring process. The little empirical work
that presently exists is quite dated (particularly in this rapidly changing market) and also is much less comprehensive than our effort.8 We
use our results to present a broad empirical picture of the market
from both judges' and students' perspectives.

1999 Judge Survey #26d. For details on our citation practices for survey responses, see
6
Part II.B.2.
7
Abner I. Mikva, Judicial Clerkships:A Judge's View, 36 J Legal Educ 150,152 (1986).
8
A survey of judges was conducted in the early 1990s, as was a survey of law students. See
Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer, and Guido Calabresi, The FederalJudicialLaw Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 Yale L J 207,212 & n 16 (1994) (describing
survey of federal appellate judges to determine whether they would agree to a benchmark starting date for interviews); Lynn K. Rhinehart, Note, Is There Gender Bias in the JudicialLaw Clerk
Selection Process?, 83 Georgetown L J 575, 577-78 (1994) (describing survey of third-year law
students).
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Part II describes our empirical findings. On the judge side, we
surveyed all federal appellate judges in both 1999 and 2000 and received responses from 65 percent of the judges in 1999 and from 54
percent in 2000. This gives us a reasonably comprehensive picture of
the law clerk market as viewed from the judge side. We also sought
the input of the nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court and
received responses from eight of them. On the student side, we conducted surveys in 1999 and again in 2000 about the hiring process. Our
results provide a window on how the hiring process is regarded by applicants, how well students are being matched to judges, and how the
process is affecting students' decisions to apply for clerkships.
Part III looks at other markets that have had difficulty in establishing the timing of transactions. Markets with such timing problems
can be found in a wide range of settings; they include markets for athletic tournaments, markets for medical residents, and markets for social club memberships. Part III attempts to educe from the existing
economics literature what has been learned from the extensive study
of this other set of markets.
Part IV tackles the question of what, if anything, should be done
in the market for federal judicial law clerks. The main possibilities, in
their rough contours, are familiar from the existing legal literature: (1)
Leave the hiring process unregulated (as at present); (2) Establish
start dates for offers and perhaps also interviews (a strategy that has
been tried in the law clerk market on numerous past occasions); and
(3) Institute some form of centralized matching of judges and clerks.
The last approach is the one presently used in the market for medical
residency positions (as well as in a variety of other markets). One of
the present authors (Roth) was responsible for the design of the centralized matching process presently used for medical residencies.!
Because of the diversity of opinion expressed in the existing literature and in our surveys on the matter of reform, we will not try to
focus on any one of these three approaches. Rather we shall attempt
to describe, in light of the evidence and insights presented in Parts I
through III, how each of these approaches could best be implemented.
We will then assess each solution's likelihood of success in light of
what we know from our evidence and the experience of other markets. Of the possibilities we consider, the most promising appears to
be the use of a centralized matching process for those judges who wish
their clerks to be eligible for United States Supreme Court clerkships,

with enforcement of the centralized matching requirement by the Su9 See Alvin E. Roth and Elliott Peranson, The Redesign of the Matching Market for
American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design, 89 Am Econ Rev 748
(1999).
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preme Court. We describe this proposal in more detail in Part IV.D
below. It is meant to pick up on a fundamental finding of our judge
survey responses; the finding is that judges are not and do not perceive themselves to be a homogenous group when it comes to the hiring of law clerks.
I. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

A natural prerequisite for assessing whether what is happening in
the market for federal judicial law clerks is good or bad is a set of
normative criteria against which to make that assessment. We begin
with the concern most often voiced by judges-that the current process casts the bench into disrepute. We then turn to the question of the
efficiency and perceived fairness of the current process of law clerk
hiring.
Throughout the discussion it is important to distinguish between
two separate, although related, features of the market for federal judicial law clerks. The first is that hiring tends to occur in a rough-andtumble manner, with judges making short-fuse offers, trying to outmaneuver each other, and so forth. The second, distinct feature is that hiring tends to occur very early in the student's law school career. These
two things are related in important ways, of course, but for our normative analysis it is important to distinguish between them."
Throughout our discussion we focus on the market for federal,
and especially federal appellate, judicial clerkships. We adopt this focus because the market for federal, and particularly federal appellate,
clerkships is the market in which most of the problems with which we
are concerned have arisen.
A. Disillusionment with the Federal Bench
From judges' perspective, the biggest concern with the current
state of the law clerk market seems to be the disrepute cast upon the
bench by the way in which hiring is done. (Judges are also likely to
care about some of the other problems we describe below.) Indeed,
the impetus for one of the prior reform efforts was an article in The
New York Times that painted a colorful picture of the judicial "freefor-all" that occurred as judges "behav[ed] like 6-year-olds" in the
rush to hire law clerks." One judge likened the process to a "calf
10 See Hao Li and Sherwin Rosen, Unraveling in Matching Markets, 88 Am Econ Rev 371,
371-72 (1998) (discussing the distinction between strategic behavior in transactions and how early
the transactions occur).
11 See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 209-10 (cited in note 8), quoting David
Margolick, At the Bar:Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, with Judicial Decorum Left in
the Dust,NY Tunes B4 (Mar 17, 1989).
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scramble," which is "the low point of many western rodeos. A small
number of calves are turned loose in the arena, along with a larger
number of adolescent cow persons. The latter attempt to seize, subdue
and carry out the former. The SPCA [Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals] writes letters to the editor during the following
week."'" (Presumably the "adolescent cow persons" here are the
judges.)
The "judicial disrepute" normative perspective on the law clerk
market is relatively simple. A system in which hiring occurred in an
orderly and respectable manner would be preferable to a system that
can be likened to a "calf scramble." The fact that hiring occurs early in
the students' law school careers might not be an independent problem
on this view; rather it may be merely a symptom of the other problem-that judges are jockeying for position and trying to outmaneuver one another in the competition for the best law clerks.
Other normative criteria turn out to be more complex, as we shall
see.
B.

Efficiency

From an economist's perspective, the natural question to ask
about the market for federal judicial law clerks is whether it is efficient. A foundation for an efficient market is the ability of market participants to consider and compare the alternatives available in the
marketplace.'3 Thus one potential source of inefficiency in the law
clerk market is that the "calf scramble" forces judges and students to
make choices before they can make real comparisons. A second (related but distinct) potential cause of inefficiency is the early date at
which hiring takes place. If the quality of the match between judge
and clerk depends on attributes that are not adequately predicted by
information available after the first year of law school (and would be
better predicted by a fuller law school record), then hiring may be occurring at an inefficiently early time."

Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 210 n 8 (cited in note 8) (quoting Judge Alfred T Goodwin).
13 Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 992 (cited in note 3).
14 Note that salaries are highly regulated in the law clerk market. For recent analyses of
12

matching in contexts in which salaries are flexible, see Hao Li and Wing Suen, Risk Sharing,Sorting, and Early Contracting, 108 J Pol Econ 1058 (2000); Wing Suen, A Competitive Theory of
Equilibriumand Disequilibrium Unravelingin Two-Sided Matching,31 Rand J Econ 101 (2000).
For a discussion of relaxing salary restrictions in the market for federal judicial law clerks, see
Edward S.Adams, A Market-Based Solution to the JudicialClerkship Selection Process,59 Md L
Rev 129,167-72 (2000). However, many of the inefficiency results apply both to matching with
fixed salaries and to matching with flexible salaries. See, for example, Roth and Xing, 84 Am
Econ Rev at 1034-35 (cited in note 3).
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We elaborate on these issues below, considering them in the light
of several different possible standards of efficiency.
1. Pareto efficiency.
One standard is Pareto efficiency, which says that an outcome is
efficient as long as there is no way to make one or more parties better
off without making at least one person worse off. Under this standard,
the market for federal judicial law clerks is likely to be efficient. The
Pareto standard is notoriously limited in its usefulness, for rarely can
one make some people better off without making even a single person
worse off."
To be sure, it is possible that the law clerk market is suboptimal
for all participants. Everyone might be better off if hiring occurred in
an orderly manner, at a later time, or both." But it seems more likely
that some gun-jumping judges would be made worse off by such a reform, since they would no longer have the bargaining advantage that
they seek to get from acting early. (Certainly Judge Kozinski's view in
his well-known article Confessions of a Bad Apple seems to be that
such reform would make him worse off.")
Thus, the remainder of our analysis will consider two other, more
useful conceptions of "efficiency."
2. Maximizing the "sum total of satisfaction" of judges and
clerks.
If the standard of efficiency is not Pareto efficiency but instead
some broader notion of maximizing something like "the sum total of
the satisfaction" (however measured) of judges and students with
their matches, where some parties' gains can be traded off against
others' losses, then several arguments suggest that the current market
is likely to be inefficient. We first consider the nature of the process
and then the distinct issue of the early time at which hiring is done. In
both cases, however, the inefficiency we identify may be muted by the
fact that the positions in question last for only a short time, and also
by the fact that each judge has multiple law clerks, who are plausible
substitutes for one another.
a) The nature of the process. One benefit of a market is that it
brings together many buyers and sellers at the same time, so that they
can consider a wide range of transactions. ' But the present market for
judicial clerks is quite narrow: the buyers (of clerks' services) and sell15 See, for example, Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J Legal Stud 191,193 (1980).
See Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1034-35, 1039-40 (cited in note 3).
Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1708-08,1719-21 (cited in note 1).
18 Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 992 (cited in note 3).

16

17
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ers (of those services) typically can consider very few possible transactions. Indeed, as we document below, in many instances the sellers can
consider only one possible transaction-the one with the judge who
first makes them an offer."
Why are many of the gains of a market lost when participants are
not able to consider a range of options? In a market with limited
numbers of buyers and sellers, parties are not able to gather information about multiple options and then act on that information to seek
out their most preferred alternatives. Choices must be made from a
very small set of alternatives and in a very compressed period. Decisions must be reached on the basis of extremely limited information.
And if participants try to refine their information, they may not be
able to do so in a timely enough fashion, since time spent in ultimately
fruitless courtship (for instance, in making an offer that is subsequently refused) means that other candidates will have matched and
left the market. All of these features have the potential to introduce
substantial inefficiency." In addition, this process may be so unappealing to some clerkship candidates that they drop out of the process altogether.
b) Early hiring. The costs of a rough-and-tumble process exist
whatever the timing of hiring; even if such a process occurred at the
middle or the end of students' third year of law school, the inability of
participants to consider a range of options would reduce the ordinary
gains from a well-functioning market. The fact that hiring also occurs
very early in students' law school career poses a distinct set of problems. These are mostly related to the limited amount of information
available when hiring is done early (wholly apart from the informational limitations that result from a chaotic process).
As will be described more fully in Part II, almost two-thirds of
the federal appellate judges responding to our survey about the 19992000 law clerk hiring season were entirely done with their hiring by
January 31 of the applicants' second year of law school. A few students apply for clerkships in their third year, but this is a relatively
small number." Thus decisions for the typical judge were based solely
on first-year grades and recommendations (since first-semester second-year grades were not yet available), together with the student's
record prior to law school.
The problem with such early hiring is that two-thirds of the information about the student's academic record in law school, plus vir19 See Part I.C.l.a.
20 Such inefficiency is examined in simulations motivated by the market for clinical psychologists in Alvin E. Roth and Xiaolin Xing, Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: DecentralizedMatching in the Marketfor Clinical Psychologists,105 J Pol Econ 284 (1997).
21 See Part lI.B.3.c.
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tually all of the information about the student's legal writing, which
typically is done in the second and third years, is missing. Realistically,
hiring would probably not occur at the very end of the third year even
under a reformed system for hiring law clerks, but it could certainly
happen sometime during the third year, so that at least the full second-year record would be available. Obviously, assessing the impact of
this missing information on the satisfaction of judges and students
with their matches is difficult. Is the quality of a student's legal writing
well-predicted by the student's first-year grades? How well do students' GPAs at the end of the second year correlate with their firstyear GPAs?
It is (for obvious reasons) not very easy to get data on grades, but
we do have data from a relatively recent Harvard Law School class,
comparing first-year GPA to the GPA for the first and second years
together." At most this limited amount of data can offer anecdotal
support for any claim, but we think the results are interesting and so
mention them briefly. The overlap between the two measures in the
top of the class is not small, but neither are the discrepancies. Of the
students who were in the top 5 percent of the class (the top twentyseven students) at the end of the first year, two-thirds of them were in
the top 5 percent at the end of the second year. The other students
who were in the top 5 percent of their first-year class were (in order of
decreasing class rank) twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth, thirty-sixth, fortysecond, forty-seventh, forty-eighth, fiftieth, fifty-ninth, and sixty-ninth
at the end of the second year. The students who were ranked fortysecond, forty-seventh, forty-eighth, fiftieth, fifty-ninth, and sixty-ninth
would almost certainly not have been competitive for the very top
clerkships had they held those positions in class rank after the first
year. The students who took these nine students' place in the top 5
percent by the end of the second year were ranked (again in order of
decreasing rank) twenty-ninth, thirty-third, forty-second, forty-sixth,
forty-ninth, fiftieth, sixty-ninth, seventy-fifth, and eighty-fourth at the
end of the first year. Probably the last seven of these did not have a
shot at the very best clerkships based on their first-year grades, even
though just one year later they were within the top 5 percent of their
class at Harvard Law School. A brief look at the top 2 percent of the
class-the pool for the most highly elite clerkships of all-at the end
of the first versus the second year shows even greater movement:
fewer than half of the students in the top 2 percent at the end of the
first year remain there at the end of the second year.
In short, early hiring seems to create a real risk of mismatches in
both directions: some students hired for the most competitive clerk22

The data discussed in this paragraph are on file with the authors.
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ships on the basis of first-year standing may prove to be less strong
than judges had hoped, and some of the most competitive students
may not be identifiable on the basis of first-year grades. It is true that
large law firms likewise hire for second-year summer positionswhich may turn into permanent positions-on the basis of first-year
grades. However, since law firms have a large range of types of work
(ranging from the relatively mundane to the complex), hire a large
number of associates each year (versus a small number of clerks in the
judicial setting), and decide to offer permanent jobs in significant part
based on summer performance, errors are likely to be less serious in
this market than in the law clerk market.
In assessing the power of first-year grades to predict second-year
grades, it should be noted that one cannot be sure what second-year
grades would look like if clerkships were not decided before these
grades come out. One possibility is that students who do not receive
clerkships (or who, having received mediocre first-year grades, know
that they will not receive clerkships) may throw in the towel and stop
trying. Another possibility is that students who get clerkships may decide that their future is set and thus that they need not try any more.
Either phenomenon would distort second-year grades relative to firstyear grades; second-year grades would be a less clear measure of "legal ability" (and of course they may be noisy already). They may also
be a less clear measure because of strategic selection of easier courses;
such strategic course selection cannot generally occur during the first
year because schedules are set without student choice. A thoughtprovoking implication of these suggestions is that judges who wait
longer to hire their clerks may be "fooled" by the high second-year
grades of those not hired earlier, as their grades may be artificially inflated by less exertion of effort by students who receive clerkships
early and by strategic course selection. But in fact slacking off and
strategic course selection by students who do not get clerkships seem
more likely; students who get clerkships, or at least students who get
the most prestigious clerkships, are likely to care about grades for
other reasons (graduation honors, Supreme Court clerkships, positions
in legal academia), which give them reason not to slack off.
Early hiring does not impose unambiguous costs on the parties.
While less information is available, risk-averse parties enjoy some
benefit from resolving uncertainty earlier and, in effect, insuring
themselves against the possibility that things could turn out badly for
them. 3 This story seems most applicable on the student side; for students, things could turn out badly if their law school careers do not
progress in the way they might hope. The economic literature on
23

See Li and Rosen, 88 Am Econ Rev at 372 (cited in note 10).
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matching shows that with risk-averse parties, early hiring may sometimes create benefits. But in other similar contexts we do not seem to
think that early transactions for insurance purposes produce a better
outcome; for instance, no one argues that students should be admitted
to college based on sixth-grade test scores in order to "insure" students against not turning out as well as they might hope. (And we do
not think this is only because of the large degree of information loss
that would result.) It is equally unclear why such insurance would on
balance be desirable in the clerkship setting.
3. Maximizing the "production of justice."
Until now the efficiency discussion has focused on the well-being
of the parties to the clerkship match-judges and students. The emphasis has been on achieving "good," or desirable, matches from both
sides' perspective. Another conception of efficiency focuses on the
overall quality of the legal system and thus on those who are not necessarily market participants. Does the law clerk market maximize the
"production of justice" (however defined)? This question can be rephrased: Is failing to match the most desired clerkship candidates to
the most desired judges-that is, failing to match in accordance with
the parties' preferences-a bad thing or a good thing from the perspective of maximizing the "production of justice"?
If the quality of judicial output is an additive function of judges'
and clerks' ability, then the matching does not matter, holding constant the aggregate pool of clerks hired. If, instead, the output quality
of relatively less desired judges benefits from the input of top clerks
more than the output quality of relatively more desired judges does,
then "mismatches" are actually good for societal welfare. Finally, if the
benefit of having a top clerk is greatest for the most desired judges (in
other words, the judicial output function is multiplicative), then "mismatches" are likely to reduce societal welfare. There are other factors
as well; for instance, a top law clerk may benefit more from the coaching of a more desirable judge, and this may produce broader benefits
for society as the clerk pursues his or her own career after the clerkship. All in all, it turns out to be quite difficult to say how mismatches
affect the overall quality of the legal system. For this reason, we give
primary emphasis below to the criterion of maximizing the satisfaction
of judges and clerks with the match.

24

See id.
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Perceived Fairness

Judges and students may care not only about the match that resuits from the law clerk hiring process but also about the nature of the
matching experience itself. Even if Judge A and student B are quite
happy to be paired with one another at the end of the road, if the
process of getting to that point was unpleasant, the market may still
cause disutility and, thus, may be suboptimal.
We have already discussed judges' distaste for the law clerk hiring process.' Our survey results suggest that students may have similar
or even stronger feelings. We focus below on a particular form of disutility on students' part. Since it is hard for participants in this market
to get good information about one another, various forms of personal
well-connectedness may come to play a large role, and students (as
well as judges) may perceive this to be unfair. We discuss evidence
along these lines in Part II.C.3.
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

A. A Brief History of the Law Clerk Market
To understand the story told by our empirical evidence, it is helpful first to understand what has gone before. The history of the market
for federal judicial law clerks and the attempts to reform it have been
described well and fully by others, so we offer only the barest essentials here.26
Over the past several decades, the time of hiring of law clerks has
moved from the end of the third year of law school to the beginning
or middle of the second year. Judge Wald writes of her experience, "I
was hired in 1951 as a clerk to Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank in
May of my third year." 7 During the 1999-2000 hiring season, by contrast, the process was well underway by mid-fall of the second year, as
documented below.2
Each stage in the backward progression in the time of hiring of
federal judicial law clerks has been marked by a belief that the market
will never move earlier than the present moment-that the process
has reached a "natural stopping point" beyond which it will not move.
Judge Kozinski, writing in 1991, provides an example:
[T]he breakpoint for many judges in making clerkship decisions
comes around February or March of a student's second year of
25 See Part I.A.
26 For a full account through 1994, see Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 20821 (cited in note 8).
27 See Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 155 (cited in note 2).
28 See Part II.C.l.b.
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law school. At that time several things come to pass. Perhaps
most important, the student's third semester grades become
available. Also, many students will have developed relationships
with members of the faculty by working as research assistants,
participating in individual research projects, writing papers or
participating in seminars. By that time as well, students will have
had a fair opportunity to show commitment to their law reviews
by participating in the editing process or doing substantial work
toward publication of their comments. For those of us who care
about such things-and there are many-law review board elections are conducted around that time."
Of course, hiring has now moved to a point well before Judge Kozinski's "breakpoint."
The past two decades have witnessed a parade of attempted reforms of the market for federal judicial law clerks. These reforms have
had in common their inability to solve the problem. The average life of
a reform has been about three years.3' The latest reform effort, begun
in 1993, involved the imposition of a March 1 start date and initially
appeared promising to its sponsors, who stated hopefully after its first
year of operation that although "[w]e entertain no illusions that the
March 1 Solution is perfect, [ ] we respectfully submit that, like democracy with all its flaws, it is the best system that anyone has conceived thus far., 3' However, it was this very reform that the Judicial
Conference abandoned in 1998 after an acknowledgement that it was
"not universally followed and, therefore [] not an accurate reflection
of the practice in the courts.32
Thus, since 1998, there has been no official Judicial Conference
policy governing the hiring of federal judicial law clerks. In the first
year after the abandonment of the March 1 start date, some law
schools attempted to enforce a February 1 start date for sending application materials, including faculty recommendations, to judges, but
these efforts were largely abandoned the following year (as well as
somewhat ignored in the year in which they were nominally in effect).
To learn more about what is presently happening in the market for
federal judicial law clerks, we surveyed both judges and students
about the process.

Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1710 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added).
See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 209-15 (cited in note 8) (describing five
failed reform efforts over the period from 1978 to 1990); text accompanying note 135 (describing
the abandonment of the sixth, most recent reform attempt, begun in 1993, in September of 1998).
31 Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 222 (cited in note 8).
32 Report of the Proceedingsof the JudicialConference of the United States 38 (Sept 15, 1998).
29
30
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Survey Design and Response
1. Survey of Supreme Court Justices.

In October of 1999 we sent a letter to the nine active Supreme
Court Justices asking about their law clerk hiring practices and how
these might relate to the hiring practices of other federal judges. The
letter came from the judge-author of the present work (Posner) and
promised confidentiality to the Justices. Eight of the nine members of
the Court responded. We discuss their responses in connection with our
analysis in Part IV of possible reforms of the law clerk market and the
potential role of the Supreme Court in enforcing these reforms.
2. Surveys of court of appeals judges.
In September of 1999 and again in June of 2000 we distributed a
survey about law clerk hiring to all federal appellate judges. The judgeauthor of this Article (Posner) mailed the surveys to all active and senior court of appeals judges.33 For confidentiality reasons we requested
that the judges return their responses to another of us (Jolls) rather
than to him. Also, we did not ask for respondents' names, but we did ask
for the judge's court (First Circuit, Second Circuit, etc.) and the general
timeframe in which the judge was appointed, and from this information
it would be possible to identify some judges. We therefore assured
judges that identifying information would be shielded from the judgeauthor of this work as well as kept confidential from the public at large.
The 1999 and 2000 surveys were quite similar, although the 2000 version
included a few new questions.
The 1999 survey yielded 155 responses from judges, a 65 percent
response rate. Of the responses, 103 were from active judges, while 51
were from senior judges. (One respondent did not specify seniority.)
This response pattern reflects almost an exact match to the overall
proportion of active judges versus senior judges on the bench (161 active, 77 senior), as shown in Table Al in the attached Data Appendix.
The 2000 survey yielded a similar, although slightly lower, response
rate of 54 percent, perhaps because some judges were disinclined to
bother responding a second time. Again the pattern of responses from
active and senior judges (84 and 45 responses respectively) was almost
an exact match to the overall proportion of active judges versus senior
judges on the bench (again see Table Al). Across individual circuits
there was somewhat greater, although not enormous, variation in the
response rates, as summarized in Table Al. All surveys that were re33 A small number of senior court of appeals judges from the Seventh Circuit were not
surveyed because the sender of the survey (Posner), a judge on that Circuit, knew that they were
no longer hiring law clerks.
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turned to us were assigned numbers, and these are what we use to
identify particular responses that we quote or rely upon.
As is obvious from the description just given, our judge data embrace only federal appellate judges; they do not include information
on federal district court judges or state court judges. While it is true
that some of the most elite federal district court and state court judges
probably compete with federal court of appeals judges for clerks, the
number of such plausible competitors is sufficiently limited, relative to
the overall size of the pool of federal district court and state court
judges, to justify the limitation of the distribution of our survey to federal appellate judges.
3. Surveys of students.
In surveying students about the law clerk market, we faced a scope
problem similar to, although vastly greater in magnitude than, the problem faced for judges. Having decided to focus on federal appellate
judges to avoid an enormous survey pool, our interest on the student
side was in students who were potential candidates for clerkships with
such judges. At some level, though, that group includes every law student in the country, since students serving in federal appellate clerkships hail from an extraordinary number of schools ranging from Detroit Mercy to St. John's University to Louisiana State (LSU) to Harvard. - Because it was obviously impracticable to survey every student
at every law school in the country, we were forced to make choices
about how to narrow the group. One approach, which was the approach
taken in the only existing survey of clerkship candidates of which we
are aware, is to limit the sample to students serving on the main law review at one of some suitably defined set of "very good" schools (say,
schools in the top ten or twenty).35 The second approach, which is the
one we adopted, involves surveying all students, not just members of the
main law review, at an even smaller number of schools.
Two empirical factors support our focus on all students, not just
members of the main law review, at a smaller number of schools. First,
membership in a school's main law review does not appear to be of
overriding or even particularly great importance in the selection process of court of appeals judges. Our 2000 judge survey asked judges to
rank the following eight factors in order of their importance to the
judges' law clerk hiring decisions: law school grades, recommendations
from familiar professors, recommendations from other professors,
recommendations from past legal employers, recommendations from
34
See Judicial Yellow Book 52, 58, 81, 83 (Spring 2000) (listing these schools as the alma
maters of federal appellate clerks).
35 See Rhinehart, Note, 83 Georgetown L J at 577 n 12 (cited in note 8).
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current clerks and other "peers," membership in the school's main law
review, board position at the school's main law review, and writing
sample. (We did not ask judges to rank the importance of the personal
interview because it seemed likely to be of substantial importance to
almost all of them.) Table A2 in the Data Appendix summarizes the
rankings given to membership in the school's main law review. Over
half of the judges who provided rankings (55 of 109) said that membership in the main law review was either in the bottom half of factors
in terms of importance or was not a factor in their decisions at all.
Only six judges said that such membership was the most important of
the eight factors to their decisions.
The second empirical factor that supports looking at all law students at a smaller number of schools as opposed to only members of
the main law review at a larger number of schools is that students
from the four law schools generally considered to be the most competitive (Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale in alphabetical order)
strongly dominate students from the remaining top ten and top twenty
schools in their success in landing federal appellate clerkships. (For
the top ten and the top twenty lists, we use the (admittedly controversial) US. News and World Report rankings from 2000. Harvard, Stanford, and Yale are the top three schools according to this ranking; Chicago is sixth")
Table A3 in the Data Appendix presents the number of students
from each group of schools serving in federal appellate clerkships according to data from the Spring 2000 edition of the Judicial Yellow
Book. It is important to emphasize at the outset the limitations of
these data: they cover only those judges who choose to report their
clerks' schools (approximately one-third do not report), and, much
more importantly, the variations in reporting rates across circuits are
substantial. As a result of the latter point, the numbers in Table A3 are
probably understated (relatively speaking) for the California schools,
including Stanford, as well as the Universities of Pennsylvania and
Texas, and probably overstated for Chicago, New York University, and
Columbia; the reason is that the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits (covering Pennsylvania, Texas, and California respectively) have (along
with the Eighth Circuit) the lowest rates of coverage in the Judicial
Yellow Book (with percentages ranging from 42 to 63 percent), while
the Second and Seventh Circuits (covering New York and Chicago respectively) have much higher coverage rates (81 percent for the Second Circuit, 87 percent for the Seventh Circuit).
Despite the limitations of the Judicial Yellow Book data, Table
A3, coupled with the information in Table A2, provides support for
36

US News & World Rep 73 (Apr 10, 2000).
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the approach of looking comprehensively at the very top tier of
schools instead of looking only at members of the main law review at
a somewhat broader set of institutions. Students from Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale held 143 clerkships (an average of thirty-six
per school), compared to ninety-three for students from the next six
schools (an average of sixteen per school) and sixty-eight for students
from the remaining ten of the top twenty institutions (an average of
seven per school). Note that what is relevant for our purposes is the
absolute representation of the schools, not how they fare relative to
their student body sizes, since our goal is to get information from the
largest absolute number of potential federal appellate clerks.
The remainder of this section provides further detail on how we
conducted our student surveys.
a) 2000 survey of second-year students. In February of 2000 we

distributed a survey about the 1999-2000 law clerk hiring process to
all second-year students at Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale. Surveys were placed in student mailboxes, and students were provided
with a stamped, pre-addressed envelope in which to return their responses to one of us (Jolls). Students were assured that no potentially
identifying information in their responses would be revealed publicly
or even to the judge-author of this work. Students were not asked to
put their names on their responses.
We received a total of 294 responses, a 26 percent response rate.
Presumably the lower response rate for students than for federal appellate judges reflected the fact that while almost all federal appellate
judges hire law clerks, many law students do not apply for federal appellate clerkships. We received 129 responses from students who applied for federal appellate clerkships (and 165 from students who did
not; students were asked to return the survey either way), but since we
do not know the actual number of students who applied for these positions, we cannot calculate a response rate for the 129 responses. As
with the judge surveys, all 2000 second-year student surveys returned
to us were assigned numbers, which are used to identify the responses
below.
b) 1999 survey of second-year students. In March of 1999 we dis-

tributed a survey to all second-year students at the four law schools
surveyed in 2000 and also to all second-year students at three additional schools, Columbia, Michigan, and Vanderbilt. In contrast to the
2000 student survey, which sought mostly quantitative or categorical
information (for instance, "in what month did you apply?," "how many
interviews did you do?"), the 1999 survey was largely anecdotal, with
mostly open-ended essay or long-answer questions. This survey, administered just as our project was getting underway, provided a natural starting point for our research.
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The survey was distributed by multiple means. At schools other
than Harvard, it was left in students' mailboxes with instructions to return responses to a drop box at a specified location; at some of these
schools the survey was also distributed via electronic mail. At Harvard
the survey was left in students' mailboxes, again with instructions to
return responses to a drop box; in addition some students received
copies of the survey in their large "bundled" classes. As with the 2000
survey, students were not asked for their names and were assured of
the confidentiality of any possibly identifying information."
We received a total of 337 responses to the 1999 survey. Table A4
in the Data Appendix provides a breakdown by school and by
whether the respondent applied for federal judicial clerkships. (In
1999 we asked whether the student had applied for federal judicial
clerkships, appellate or district court level; in 2000 we asked whether
the student had applied for federal appellate clerkships specifically.
Also, for 2000 we do not have data by school because one school objected to having school identification on the survey in 2000.) In the interest of consistency with the 2000 results, we focus our analysis of the
1999 data on the four schools surveyed in 2000; thus information from
the 1999 surveys reported below is from the surveys distributed at
Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale. These schools accounted for 267
of the 337 responses (79 percent) (see Table A4). As above, we assigned an identifying number to each response.
As just noted, our 2000 survey of second-year students asked
whether the student had applied for federal appellate clerkships, and
only students who had done so were directed to fill out the body of
the survey; the 1999 survey asked whether the student had applied for
federal appellate or district court level clerkships, and only those who
had done so were directed to fill out the body of the survey. In both
cases, however, some of the responses by students in the body of the
survey may relate to state court applications or (for the 2000 survey)
federal district court level applications, even though those were not
embraced in the opening question, because the students may have applied for those positions in addition to the ones embraced in the opening question. Obviously we could have chosen to limit subsequent
questions (such as "When was your first interview?," "When was your
first offer of a clerkship?," and "Did you receive other clerkship offers
before you rejected your first offer?") to the category of clerkships
embraced in the opening question, but this could have produced misleading or incomplete answers, since other opportunities certainly
37 At the time of the 1999 student survey, one of us (Posner) had not yet become involved
in the project. We interpreted the confidentiality promise to students as requiring that no one
other than the original three authors (Avery, Jolls, and Roth) see any potentially identifying information.
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might have affected the student's situation in the market for the clerkships covered in the opening question. Nonetheless, the cost of our
approach is that the data presented below, while only for students who
applied for some sort of federal clerkship -and for 2000 only for students who applied for federal appellate clerkships -may reflect events
in other markets as well.
c) The role of third-year students. There is a widespread perception (which we shared prior to receiving the contrary results from our
2000 judge survey) that the early time at which clerkship hiring is occurring has significantly increased the frequency of hiring of thirdyear students, making our focus on second-year students potentially
problematic. Dean Anthony Kronman of Yale Law School wrote to
the Yale student body about the subject of third-year applications in
the fall of 1999, saying that he "suspect[ed] that third year applications
will become increasingly routine" and that he "regard[ed] this development as a healthy one." Students would work at a law firm or pursue some other opportunity for a year after finishing law school and
then begin a clerkship.
The responses to our 2000 judge survey suggest, however, that
judges have not intensified their hiring of third-year students in response to the developments in the clerkship market since the 1998
abandonment of the March 1 start date. In our 2000 survey we asked
judges how many third-year students, and also how many postgraduates (candidates who had finished law school), they hired in
1999-2000 and whether these numbers were greater than, less than, or
the same as the numbers in previous years. Answers are presented in
Table A5 in the Data Appendix. No discernible trend toward increased hiring of third-year students (or post-graduates) appears in
this data.
C.

Is the Law Clerk Market Functioning Well?
Our survey results allow us to assess the functioning of the market
for federal judicial law clerks within the normative framework developed in Part I above. We first discuss findings related to the efficiency of
the clerk hiring process and then turn to findings that bear on disillusionment with the federal bench and the perceived fairness of the clerk
hiring process.

38

Memorandum from Tony Kronman to the students of Yale Law School (Dec 8, 1999)

(on file with authors).
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1. Efficiency: Maximizing the "sum of satisfaction" of judges and
clerks with the match.
Part I.B above discussed two separate efficiency criteria for assessing the workings of the law clerk market: maximizing the "sum of
satisfaction" of judges and clerks with the match, and maximizing the
"production of justice." Our survey results do not shed light on the
second criterion (which we concluded was less useful in any event),
but they have much to say about the first.
a) The nature of the process. We first consider the ways in which
the nature of the law clerk hiring process impedes maximizing the
"sum of satisfaction" of judges and clerks with the match. The biggest
problem is that, as noted above, the process does not permit judges
and clerks to consider a range of alternatives before making their decisions.
Our survey results provide strong quantitative evidence of the inability to consider a range of options on both sides of this market. The
results show in a systematic way how the clerkship market resolves extraordinarily quickly, with judges and students pairing off in an almost
frenetic fashion to avoid being left in the cold. The basic chronology,
as described more fully below, is that
"
"
"
*

interviews lead very quickly to offers (section i below);
offers produce very quick responses (section ii);
responses are generally acceptances (section iii); and
many scheduled interviews are canceled as a result (section

iv).
Thus, students and judges tend to pair off quickly with those with
whom they have early interviews. As a result,
" many students limit the judges to whom they apply to avoid
being paired off early with a less preferred judge (section v);
and
" at least some students who might otherwise be interested in
clerking avoid the process entirely (section vi).
(i) First step: interviews lead quickly to offers. The time between interviews and offers is typically very short, as revealed by responses to our 2000 survey of second-year students. (We did not ask
about the gap between interview and offer times in our 1999 survey.)
As shown in Table 1, over half of students' first offers of clerkships
were made within two days of the offering judge's interview of the
student; 34 percent were made at the conclusion of the interview.
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TABLE 1
LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN FIRST OFFER AND INTERVIEW

WITH THE OFFERING JUDGE (1999-2000)
lime between first offer and interview with the
offering judge

Offer made at end of interview
1-2 days elapsed between interview and offer
3-4 days elapsed between interview and offer
5-7 days elapsed between interview and offer
1-2 weeks elapsed between interview and offer
2+ weeks elapsed between interview and offer
Total number of responses: 101

% of responding
studentsa

34%
23%
10%
15%
8%
11%

b

Source: 2000 Student Survey.
a Percentages in this column sum to 101 percent
as a consequence of rounding.
b2000 Student Survey #23 did not answer the question

about the time elapsed between the student's first offer and the interview with the offering judge, even though this student reported receiving an offer of a clerkship. Therefore we have 101 responses for this question, versus 102 responses for a number of the questions discussed below.

Moreover, our survey results show that the judge who makes the
student's first offer typically comes early in the student's interview
schedule, as reported in Table 2. In other words, it is not ordinarily the
case that students interview with a range of judges and then receive
their first offer. As the table shows, 59 percent of first offers came
from the first or second judge with whom the student interviewed, and
36 percent came from the first judge with whom the student interviewed.
TABLE 2
INTERVIEW PRODUCING FIRST OFFER (1999-2000)
Interview producing first offer

First interview produced first offer
Second interview produced first offer
Third interview produced first offer
Fourth interview produced first offer
Fifth or subsequent interview produced first offer

% of responding
students

Total number of responses:102
Source: 2000 Student Survey.
a Percentages in this column sum to 101 percent
as a consequence of rounding.

36%
23%
19%
8%
15%
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Responses to our judge surveys in 1999 and 2000 also suggest limited time between interviews and offers. As Table 3 shows, approximately three-quarters of active judges started making offers to candidates before they had completed their scheduled interviews.
TABLE 3
THE PRACTICE OF MAKING OFFERS BEFORE COMPLETING
SCHEDULED INTERVIEWS
Group of federal

% of responding judges who began making offers

appellate judges

before completing their scheduled interviews

1998-1999
All judges
Active judges

Senior judges

64%
74%

38%

1999-2000
64%
73%

42%

Total number of
responses:

Total number of
responses:

138

114

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

The reasons for the speed of offer behavior are not difficult to
understand. In both 1999 and 2000 we asked judges why they made offers before completing interviews, and many of their explanations explicitly mentioned the fear of losing candidates to other judges. In
1999, seventy-six of the eighty-eight responding judges who started
making offers before the completion of scheduled interviews offered
reasons for this behavior, and 42 percent of those who offered reasons
specifically mentioned competition from other judges. These judges'
specific responses are listed in Table A6 of the Data Appendix. The
situation in 2000 was similar: fifty-four of the seventy-three responding judges who had started making offers before the completion of
scheduled interviews gave their reason for this choice, and one-third
of those who offered reasons specifically mentioned the fear of losing
candidates to other judges. Again these judges' specific responses are
listed in Table A6. Putting both years together, only a single judge
mentioned the desire to save time (by not conducting further interviews) as the reason for making offers before the completion of
scheduled interviews, while fifty cited competition from rivals. In response to a different question on our judge survey, over half of responding judges in both 1999 and 2000 said that competition influenced the time at which offers were made, as reported in the top panel
in Table 4 below. As described in sections ii and iii below, these offers
typically lead to quick responses, which are generally acceptances, so
making an early offer tends to give a judge a competitive edge.
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TABLE 4
FACTS ABOUT JUDGES' MOTIVATIONS FOR EARLY OFFERS

% of responding judges
1998-1999

Competition influenced
the time at which offers
were made:
All judges
Active judges
Senior judges

An applicant requested
that the timetable be
moved up:'
All judges
Active judges
Senior judges

53%
59%
40%

1999-2000

53%
63%
30%

Total number of
responses:

Total number of
responses:

140

111

N/A
N/A
N/A

46%
53%
31%
Total number of
responses:

Timetable was moved
up in response to applicant's request:a
All judges
Active judges
Senior judges

115

N/A
N/A
N/A

48%
48%
50%
Total number of
responses:
52

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
These questions were only asked in the 2000 Judge Survey.

In many instances, judges who made quick offers may have been
responding to explicit requests by students to speed up their timetables. Our 2000 judge survey showed that 53 percent of active judges
reported that an applicant had asked them to speed up the process
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because of a pending interview or offer deadline from another judge,
as shown in the bottom panel of Table 4.39 Almost half of those who
received such a request moved up their timetables, also as shown in
the bottom panel in Table 4.
(ii) Second step: offers lead quickly to responses. Not only do
interviews lead quickly to offers, but offers lead quickly to responses;
this is not a market in which students collect a substantial number of
offers and then make their decisions. As Table 5 shows, our 2000 student survey revealed that almost three-quarters of students responded
to their first offer of a clerkship within two days of receiving the offer.Y Clearly this is a market in which events move very quickly with
little apparent time to consider multiple options. Indeed, 42 percent of
students responded to their first offer immediately.
TABLE 5
TIMING OF STUDENT RESPONSE TO FIRST
CLERKSHIP OFFER (1999-2000)
Time before responding to first offer
Immediate response

Within 2 days
3 days to 1 week
More than 1 week

% of responding students
(cumulative % in parentheses)
42%

29%
21%
8%
Total number of responses: 102

(42%)

(71%)
(92%)
(100%)

Source: 2000 Student Survey.

The reasons for the quick response times by students are again
easy to understand. Most obviously, many judges impose explicit response deadlines at the time an offer is made. Among respondents to
our 2000 judge survey, 25 percent reported requiring an answer within
one day for one or more of their slots, 38 percent reported requiring
an answer within forty-eight hours, and 68 percent reported requiring
an answer within a week. These numbers are similar to, although
slightly higher than, the corresponding numbers from 1999, as shown
colorfully revealed the practice of limin Table 6." Student responses
ited-response-time offers, as shown in Table 7. At least one student at-

39 We did not ask a similar question in 1999.
40 We did not ask a similar question in 1999.
41 An earlier survey of appellate judges by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts found still more dramatic results regarding the time to respond to offers: "Almost one in
six [judges] stated that students should have to respond on the spot." Louis F Oberdorfer and
Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship Selection:A Reply To The Bad Apple, 101 Yale L J 1097, 1102 n 18

(1992).
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tempted unsuccessfully to gain additional time from a judge: "I asked
for 24 hrs. to consult my wife, but [the judge]
said he couldn't give me
2
24 hrs. I guaranteed him I would accept.,
TABLE 6
TIME-LIMITED OFFERS As REPORTED BY JUDGES

Time within which response to offer
required

Within 24 hours
Within 48 hours
Within a week

% of responding judges
1998-1999

1999-2000

22%
34%
67%
Total number
of responses:
108

25%
38%
68%
Total number
of responses:
85

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

TABLE 7
TIME-LIMITED OFFERS As EXPERIENCED BY STUDENTS

Survey
1999 Survey #154'
1999 Survey #105
1999 Survey #159
2000 Survey #244
1999 Survey #118
1999 Survey #108

2000 Survey #247

Comment
A Ninth Circuit judge in California made
clerkship offers good for only fifteen minutes.
[A particular judge] made an offer on the
spot with no time to decide.
[A particular judge] gave [me] 1.5 hours to
decide after being given an offer.
[A particular judge] wanted an answer on the
spot.
[A particular judge] extended an offer only
until the next morning.
[My] second choice judge g[a]ve an exploding
offer on the phone (i.e., I had to give an answer by the time I hung up) before [I was]
able to call/talk to my first choice judge.
I had to respond [to a particular judge's offer]
by the next morning.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys.
a This response took the form of a newspaper editorial
that the student had written about the
market for federal judicial law clerks.

42

1999 Student Survey #157.
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Even when an offer does not explicitly expire after only a very
short period, a variety of implicit pressures operate to press for a
speedy response by the student. To begin, some judges make offers to
more candidates than they have slots available, with the slots going to
the first candidates to accept. Not surprisingly, "[u]sually the clerk applicant accepts on the spot. 43 Interestingly, this sort of strategy is explicitly prohibited by the Harvard Law School Office of Career Services for law firms interviewing Harvard Law School students.In addition, many students may feel the need to respond to an offer quickly if they think there is some chance they would want to accept because a delayed acceptance might start the relationship off on
the wrong foot.
I had an offer from one judge that I had to respond to during a
short period of time, but I was still waiting to hear from my top
choice. My top choice called me half an hour before my deadline
with the other judge. I was worried that the first judge would be
offended that I waited so long to respond to his offer."
[A particular judge] [m]entioned how, if he were to give an offer
to someone and they didn't immediately accept, it would make
him wonder if he had made the right choice and 'almost' ma[k]e
him want to withdraw it-but he said he didn't do that, said he
might give a little time.6
I was frustrated that my top choice judge hadn't even started interviewing when I got my offer. I felt my only choice was to take
the offer, as [I] couldn't make the [offering] judge wait 2 weeks
on the chance that I might get an offer [from the other judge]. 7
The following striking anecdote suggests that the perception about
negative impressions from a delay followed by an acceptance or attempted acceptance is likely to be correct for at least some judges:
I have an interview scheduled with my most preferred judge
([Judge C]) on [later date]. [Judge D] calls and wants me to interview on [earlier date]. I ask [Judge D] when she would be making
43 1999 Judge Survey #106. A similar strategy was used in hiring economics professors at Ohio
State University in 1970. The university "was authorized to fill six positions, and it made offers to 11
candidates, saying that the offer would remain open only until the first six acceptances were received." Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1036 n 78 (cited in note 3).
44 See Harvard Law School Office of Career Services 1999 Rules and Requests for Organizations Interviewing Harvard Law School Students Rule 3 ("No offer shall be made conditional upon a student's accepting it before acceptances have been received from other students
to whom offers have also been made.") (on file with authors).
45 1999 Student Survey #131.
46 1999 Student Survey #50.
47 2000 Student Survey #12.
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her offers, and she says, "I am going to wait until after I finish all
the interviews, talk with my clerks and then decide-so [after the
later date of the Judge C interview]." So, I go to interview with
[Judge D] on [earlier date]. I explain that I have another interview scheduled on [later date] during the interview. She calls me
on [date prior to later date of Judge C interview] with an offer. I
like [Judge D], but have my heart set on at least getting to interview with [Judge C]. Because [Judge D] is not willing to wait until
at least [later date], I decline saying I would like to interview further before making my decision. [Judge D] gets fairly offended
and says, "you know, students should withdraw right after the interview if they are not going to accept an offer."'
The perception that one is "obliged to accept every offer" 9 is part of
the reason that, as explained in the following section, students overwhelmingly respond not only quickly but affirmatively upon receiving
a clerkship offer.
(iii) Third step: responses to offers are generally acceptanceseven when other positions would be preferred. A significant majority

(73 percent) of students responding to our 2000 survey of second-year
students accepted the first offer they received, as shown in Table 8.,
Consistent with this evidence-and presumably in large part because
of it-almost 70 percent of students who received one or more clerkship offers received exactly one, also as shown in Table 8. Once again,
the law clerk market does not appear to be one in which students have
the opportunity to consider a range of options before making their
decisions.
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1999 Student Survey #135.
Id.
We did not ask a similar question in the 1999 survey.
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TABLE 8
THE PRACTICE OF ACCEPTING THE FIRST
OFFER RECEIVED (1999-2000)
Offer information

% of
responding
students

Cumulative
%

73%
27%

73%
100%

First offer was accepted (of the 102
students who responded to this question):

Yes
No

Number of offers (of the 101 students
who responded to this question and
received one or more offers):a
1

68%

68%

2

25%

93%

3
4
5

3%
2%
1%

96%
98%
99%

6

1%

100%

Source: 2000 Student Survey.
a 2000 Student Survey #12 did not indicate the number of offers
received but did answer the
question about whether the first offer was accepted; thus we have 101 responses here compared
to 102 above.

One might respond at this point that students' first offers may often come from their top-choice judges, so that the inability to consider
other options is of little consequence for them. Students certainly have
some control over the timing of their interviews, and thus (one might
argue) they can arrange to interview first with their top-choice judges.
It is clear that at least some students attempt to engage in such behavior; as one student wrote in response to our 1999 survey,
Throughout the process I ... strategize[d] and manipulate[d].

not answering the telephone for fear of being trapped into a lessthan-ideal interview early on, and trying to arrange interviews
strategically .... "
The question is how widespread and, more importantly, how successful these efforts prove to be.
One difficulty in scheduling interviews strategically, so as to meet
top-choice judges first, is that prior to interviewing with a number of
judges, students may not know who their top choices are. (And, of
51

1999 Student Survey #112.
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course, the same goes for judges.) As one student wrote, "[T]he ability
to research the federal judiciary in advance so that you know exactly
for whom you would and would not accept an offer is impossible.
What is the point of the interview on the students' side if it can't be
used to further screen for [judge] quality?"5
But even given their limited information, our 2000 student survey
results make clear that students are not able to arrange their interviews optimally so that an early offer comes from what they regard
(based on the limited information they have) as their top-choice judge.
As reported in Table 9, in only about one-third of cases was a student's first offer from what the student perceived to be his or her topchoice judge. Yet, as the table shows, 58 percent of students who received their first offer from a judge who was not their top choice
nonetheless accepted that offer. Indeed, correlating these results with
the earlier results about the timing of acceptance, 26 percent of these
candidates accepted the offer from the non-top-choice judge immediately. (This last result is not shown on the table.) The results in Table 9
are even more striking since one might expect cognitive dissonance to
push students toward the ex post belief that the offers they received
or accepted were more desirable than they otherwise might have been
thought to be.
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TABLE 9
DESIRABILITY OF AND RESPONSE TO A STUDENT'S

FIRST OFFER (1999-2000)
Desirability of and response to first offer
First offer was first-choice position (of
the 102 students who responded to this
question):
Yes
No
First offer was accepted:
Of the 35 students for whom first offer
was first-choice position:
Yes
No
Of the 67 students for whom first offer
was not first-choice position:
Yes
No

% of responding students

34%
66%

100%
0%

58%
42%

Source: 2000 Student Survey.

Results reported in Table 9 might, of course, suggest that students' first offers are the most desirable of the offers they were going
to get, even if they are not the most desirable of all possible offers. But
evidence from our 1999 student survey suggests that this is not the
case. In 1999 we asked students to rank the judges with whom they received interviews from most to least preferred and then asked them to
list the lowest judge from whom they would have accepted an offer if
they had not yet heard back from more preferred judges. 96 percent of
respondents would have accepted an offer from a judge in the lower
half of their list rather than wait for their other scheduled interviews;
44 percent would have accepted an offer from their least preferred
judge. The point is not that a clerkship with the least preferred judge
would be an undesirable outcome in an absolute sense (if no other options were available), but that many students are apparently willing to
forego any chance at the range of more attractive options to avoid losing the certain opportunity with the least preferred judge. Although
the 1999 question, unlike the question from the 2000 survey, has a hypothetical element, it indicates strongly that students will accept offers
from less preferred judges even when they are awaiting scheduled interviews with more preferred judges.
As with the practice of speedy responses to the first offer, the
reasons for the likelihood of acceptance of the first offer are easy to
understand. To begin, many students may fear that declining an offer
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is an affront to the judge, as already noted. This fear may result among
other things from pressure exerted by law professors, who are repeat
players with institutional interests and who may feel that immediate
acceptances from their school's students enhance the chances for students from that school the following year. Judge Becker, then-Judge
Breyer, and then-Dean Calabresi bemoan "the 'conventional wisdom'
propagated in many law schools that applicants are obliged to accept
the first offer tendered," a state of affairs that the authors "find ...in-

explicable and indefensible." 3 But institutional interests may explain
the puzzle; professors (or career services offices) may tell students
they must or should accept immediately even though some judges do
not require this because it serves the broader interests of the institution over the years.
A second critical factor is the strong student aversion to sacrificing a "bird in the hand" for uncertain prospects down the road. Many
student comments, quoted in Table 10, suggest that students often accept less preferred positions because they do not know whether they
will have other options later on. Apparently, accepting an early offer
from a less preferred judge is preferred to waiting out the market. But
obviously it may mean that students miss out on the chance to match
with preferred judges who may be extremely interested in them.
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TABLE 10
THE "BIRD IN THE HAND" RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTING AN
EARLY CLERKSHIP OFFER

Survey
1999 Survey
#46

1999 Survey
#120

1999 Survey
#164

1999 Survey
#5

2000 Survey
#246

2000 Survey
#247

Comment
I was made an offer in late January before the majority
of my judges even started interviewing. I chose to accept
the offer with a judge who was not in the top 1/2 rather
than take the chance on waiting for a more preferred
judge to call.
I was offered an early interview by one judge who,
though I knew I would be happy clerking for, was not
my top choice. I was led to believe he might offer a position at the interview. I had a difficult time deciding
whether to go to the interview (and possibly foreclose
other options) or cancel (and possibly lose the bird in
the hand). I went. Got an offer. Accepted.
[A]t the end I was in Union Station in DC, waiting to get
a bus to Dulles, [Judge A's] office had me on hold because they said they'd tell me yes/no by [a particular
time], and I was missing calling back [Judge B], whose
offer exploded at [that same time]. I ended up calling
[Judge B] to ask for more time, but realized how rude
that would be, so I accepted [Judge B] without knowing
[Judge A's] decision. And I missed my plane!
[W]hile in [southern city] I had received an offer from a
district court judge (with 24 hours to reply). I checked
my messages at home and found I had been offered an
interview with an appellate court judge (I had essentially
given up on the appellate court market at this time). But
I decided just to take the 'bird in the hand.'
The day after my offer, I was very interested in the offer,
but I also wanted to continue interviewing because I
wanted more information to make [my] decision. However, my judge (the one I accepted with) indicated that
he would continue to interview and might fill my slot.
I got an offer from a judge who was not my first choice,
at the end of an interview, and had to respond by the
next morning. I had an interview with my first choice
judge scheduled for the next day. I was risk averse and
took the exploding offer, but still wonder if I did the
right thing.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys.
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(iv) Fourth step: subsequent interviews are cancelled. As a re-

sult of the speed with which judges and students pair off early on, both
students and judges end up canceling large numbers of previously
scheduled interviews. Two-thirds (66 percent) of the judges responding
to our 2000 survey, and 79 percent of those responding to our 1999
survey, had at least one applicant cancel a scheduled interview, as
shown in the bottom panel of Table 11. On average, each judge conducted approximately eight interviews and experienced approximately two cancellations in each year,M so approximately 20 percent of
all scheduled interviews were cancelled by students (two cancellations
for every ten scheduled interviews). These numbers fit nicely with the
student surveys: as reported in Table 12, of the 127 students responding to our 2000 survey who had scheduled interviews, almost half (57)
reported that they cancelled at least one interview, and a total of 161
of 695 scheduled interviews, or 23 percent, were cancelled by students.5 Presumably judges also cancelled at least some interviews (or
at least one would hope that they did), since, as reported in Table 16
below, a substantial number of judges had no clerkship positions left
by the time of their last scheduled interview.
Of course, some cancellations of later interviews may be efficient,
as when neither judge nor student was at the top of the other's list and
preferred options materialize for both. But, as demonstrated above, at
least from the student side, early offers often come from non-topchoice judges, and so applicants are missing the chance to consider
what might be more preferred alternatives.

54 These numbers are based on the figures reported in Table 11. The calculations assume
the mean value for the ranges reported on the actual survey (for instance, 1.5 interviews for a
judge who chose the "i to 2" option); for the "more than 12" range for interviews conducted, the
calculations assume a value of 14, and for the "more than 6" range for interviews cancelled, they
assume a value of 8.
55 These numbers are based on the figures reported in Table 12. Twenty-eight students who
reported the number of interviews they had scheduled did not report the number of interviews
they cancelled. This is probably a consequence of our wording of the cancellation question,
which said "How many interviews did you schedule and later cancel when you accepted a position?" It seems plausible that students who did not receive any offers did not respond to this
question. Such students presumably did not cancel any interviews. The 23 percent figure in the
text thus reflects the assumption that students who responded to the question about the number
of interviews scheduled but not to the question about the number of cancellations did not cancel
any scheduled interviews. The percent cancelled would be slightly greater under a different assumption.
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TABLE 11
INTERVIEWS AND STUDENT CANCELLATIONS
As REPORTED BY JUDGES

% of responding judges
(cumulative % in parentheses)
1998-1999
1999-2000
Number of interviews
conducted:
1 to 3
4to6
7to9
10to12
More than 12

Number of cancellations
by students:
1 to2
3to4
5to6
More than 6
None

8%
25%
24%
25%
18%

(8%)
(33%)
(57%)
(82%)
(100%)

16%
26%
20%
16%
22%

(16%)
(42%)
(62%)
(78%)
(100%)

Total number of
responses:
134

Total number of
responses:
105

40%
21%
13%
4%
21%

31%
21%
7%
7%
34%

(40%)
(61%)
(74%)
(79%) a
(100%)

(31%)
(52%)
(59%)
(66%)
(100%)

Total number of
responses:

Total number of
responses:

137

113

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
a The cumulative percentage does not equal the sum of the
previous cumulative percentage and
the new percentage as a consequence of rounding.
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TABLE 12
INTERVIEWS AND STUDENT-INITIATED
CANCELLATIONS (1999-2000)
Number of
responding
students
Number of interviews scheduled:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
20
Total
Number of
interviews
cancelled:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
10
11
Total

% of
responding
students

Cumulative
%

Number
of interviews

4
15
14
17
10
12
13
14
7
1
4
3
3
4
1
3
2
127

3%
12%
11%
13%
8%
9%
10%
11%
6%
1%
3%
2%
2%
3%
1%
2%
2%

3%
15%
26%
39%
47%
57%'
67%
78%
83%'
84%
87%
90%,
92%
95%
96%
98%
100%

0
15
28
51
40
60
78
98
56
9
40
33
36
52
14
45
40
695

42
16
14
13
6
4
1
1
1
1
99

42%
16%
14%
13%
6%
4%
1%
1%
1%
1%

42%
59%'
73%
86%
92%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%

0
16
28
39
24
20
6
7
10
11
161

Source: 2000 Student Survey.
aThe cumulative percentage does not equal the sum of the previous cumulative
percentage and
the new percentage as a consequence of rounding.
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(v) Corollary:students limit their applicationpools. A natural

consequence of the speed with which things resolve in the market for
federal judicial law clerks is that students have an incentive not to apply to judges within that market in whom they are interested but not
that interested. Our student survey in both 1999 and 2000 asked, "Did
you limit the number of judges to whom you applied based on a concern that some of your less-preferred judges would offer you interviews or positions before you had heard back from your morepreferred judges?" More than half of the respondents (55 percent) answered "yes" to this question in 2000 (of a total of 128 responses to
this question). In 1999 42 percent answered "yes" (of a total of 108 responses to this question).
It should be noted that the efficiency aspects of this feature of the
clerkship market are less clear than the efficiency aspects of the features discussed above. Some desirable matches may not be made-as
when a student does not apply to a given judge who would have hired
the student, and for whom the student would have liked to clerk, and
the student ends up with no clerkship at all-but at the same time,
limited application pools save resources that would have been spent
by judges, recommenders, and other parties on matches that might
never have materialized.
(vi) Another corollary: students opt out of the process entirely.

The nature of the law clerk hiring process may also lead some students not to apply at all. More than half (58 percent) of the students
who said in response to our 2000 survey that they did not apply for
federal appellate clerkships reported that their decision not to apply
was influenced by either the nature or the timing of the market. (We
discuss the timing of the market-the early date at which the market
takes place-in more detail below.) We did not ask a similar quantitative question of students in 1999, but from that year we have anecdotal evidence, summarized in Table A7 in the Data Appendix, of a similar effect of the nature of the process on students' decisions to apply.
Obviously, if students who choose not to apply are missing opportunities that they would (in a better world) want to pursue, and judges
would be interested in some of these individuals, then the nature of
the process of law clerk hiring is impeding the satisfaction of judges'
and students' preferences.
b) Early hiring. The law clerk market may fail to maximize
judges' and clerks' satisfaction not only as a result of the nature of the
process (the focus of the previous discussion) but also as a result of
the early time at which hiring occurs. As noted in Part I above, when
hiring occurs early, judges have less information on which to base their
decisions about which clerks would be most attractive to them. Likewise, students have less information about whether and where they
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would like to clerk. Our survey results show both that the clerkship
market has moved progressively earlier in time over the last three hiring seasons and that the early time at which the market moves-like
the nature of the process itself-discourages some students from applying at all.
(i) Evidence on timing in the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 clerkship markets. Our survey results show that the clerkship market
moved relatively early in the second year of law school in 1998-1999
and earlier still in 1999-2000; these results thus provide a striking illustration of unraveling in progress.
Table 13 compiles the information reported by judges about
the timing of the market in these two years. For 1998-1999, 28 percent
of judges had begun interviewing and making offers by the end of
January 1999, and 61 percent had reviewed applications by that time.
These numbers are remarkable in light of the policy of the leading law
schools during 1998-1999 that applications and recommendation letters from law school faculty were not to be sent prior to February 1.
As the data dramatically show, this policy did not hold up. The data
also reveal that a substantial number of judges moved earlier in 19981999 than they had in 1997-1998, as reported in the penultimate row
of Table 13.
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TABLE 13
TIMING OF THE MARKET As REPORTED BY JUDGES

% of judges responding
(cumulative % in parentheses)
Date of Review of
Applications

Date of Interviews and Offers

19992000
Finish
Start a

1%
(1%)
2%
(3%)
2%
(5%)
20%
(25%)
35%

12%
(12%)
8%
(20%)
24%
(44%)
29%
(72%)'
11%

19981999
Finish
Start
Dateb
Datea
1%
1%
(1%)
(1%)
0%
0%
(1%)
(1%)
1%
1%
(2%)
(2%)
2%
8%
(3%)'
(9%)'
18%
13%

(61%)'

(84%)c

(28%)c

Mar or
later

25%
(86%)
14%
(100%)

3%
(87%)
13%
(100%)

42%
(69%)'
31%
(100%)

Earlier

29%

55%

35%

57%

2%

4%

2%

3%

19992000

19981999

Septor
earlier
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb

Dateb

Date

0%
(0%)
3%
(3%)
11%
(14%)
29%
(43%)
29%

0%
(0%)
1%
(1%)
7%
(8%)
22%
(30%)
34%

(16%)

(71%)'

(64%)

38%
(54%)
46%
(100%)

10%
(81%)
19%
(100%)

17%
(81%)
19%
(100%)

than the
prior
year

Later
than the
prior
year

Total number of judges responding:
127 for 1998-1999, 105 for 1999-2000
Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
a The start date is the date at which the judge started conducting interviews and making
offers.
bThe finish date is the date at which the judge finished conducting interviews and making offers.
CThe cumulative percentage does not equal the sum of the previous cumulative percentage and
the new percentage as a consequence of rounding.

Things happened even more quickly, and by a substantial margin,
in 1999-2000. As shown in Table 13, 72 percent of responding judges
indicated that they had reviewed applications by the end of Decem-
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ber, compared to only 25 percent in 1998-1999. 43 percent indicated
that they had started to interview candidates and make offers by the
end of December, compared to only 9 percent in 1998-1999. By the
end of January, 64 percent were completely done with interviews and
offers, compared to only 16 percent in 1998-1999. Also as shown in
Table 13, 55 percent of responding judges said that they reviewed applications earlier in 1999-2000 than they had in 1998-1999, and 57
percent said they conducted interviews and made offers earlier in
1999-2000, while almost no judges said they did either step later. By
any measure, then, the clerkship market moved substantially earlier in
1999-2000 than in 1998-1999. Table A8 in the Data Appendix provides similar timing information broken down by circuit.
On the student side, 81 percent of the students who did one or
more interviews in 1999-2000 reported having at least one interview
before the end of December of 1999, as shown on Table 14. 57 percent
of the students who received one or more offers during 1999-2000 reported having at least one offer before the end of December of 1999,
as also shown on the table.
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TABLE 14
TIMING OF THE MARKET REPORTED BY STUDENTS

Date

Sent
applications

(1999-2000)

First contact
from a judge

First interview (among

First offer
(among

(among
students who
received
such

students
who did
interviews)

students who
received
offers)

contacts)

Sept or
earlier
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb or
later

% of responding students
(cumulative % in parentheses)
0%(0%)
0%(0%)
0%(0%)
2%(2%)
20% (22%)
67% (89%)
10% (99%)
0% (99%)
1%(100%)

3% (3%)
42% (45%)
42% (87%)
10% (97%)
3%(100%)

2% (2%)
24% (26%)
55% (81%)
15% (96%)
4%(100%)

0% (0%)
14% (14%)
43% (57%)
29% (86%)
14%(100%)

Total
number of
responses:
128

Total
number of
responses:
124

Total
number of
responses:
120

Total
number of
responses:
102

Source: 2000 Student Survey.

For skeptics who tend toward the view that the current market
for federal judicial law clerks must be operating efficiently, the data
presented here raise serious questions. If 1999-2000 was efficient, then
was 1998-1999, when hiring occurred substantially later, also efficient,
or was it inefficient? More generally, given how much the timing in
this market has bounced around over the years, it seems hard to assert
that any current resting point is efficient.
The efficiency argument seems particularly strained for the 19992000 market, when the timing of the market clashed with both students' final exams and the law firm recruitment process. Tables A9-1
and A9-2 in the Data Appendix summarize student complaints about
these clashes. It seems hard to believe that the 1999-2000 timing was
optimal in any respect.
(ii) Effects of early hiring on decisions to participate in the
market. As noted above, students may opt out of the law clerk market
because of the nature of the hiring process; they may also opt out because of the early time at which hiring occurs. As noted above, we
know that more than half (58 percent) of the students who said in re-
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sponse to our 2000 survey that they did not apply for federal appellate
clerkships reported that their decision not to apply was influenced by
either the nature or the timing of the market. Also as noted above, for
1999 we have anecdotal evidence from students who did not apply for
federal clerkships, and, as shown in Table A7 in the Data Appendix,
for a number of these students the early time at which hiring occurs
was a significant factor. Thus, the early time at which hiring occurs, like
the nature of the process, may reduce the satisfaction of judges and
students by dissuading some students from applying at all.
2. Disillusionment with the federal bench.
Moving from the efficiency criterion to the concern with disillusionment with the federal bench, our survey results provide strong support for the view that the rough-and-tumble nature of the clerk hiring
process carries certain risks to the regard in which the federal judiciary
is held, at least in the direct aftermath of the hiring process. A number
of respondents to our judge and student surveys emphasized this sort of
concern, as summarized by the often poignant comments quoted in Table 15.
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TABLE 15
LAW CLERK HIRING AND REGARD FOR
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

Survey
1999 Judge
Survey #7

Comment
[T]he current non-system makes applicants see judges behaving in ways which are unseemly, to put it mildly. That
view of our behavior will inevitably shape what these people think of the judiciary. To the extent that many of these
applicants will become leaders in the bar and in politics,
we will as judges reap what we have sown. They will hold
us in contempt and will not be wholly wrong.

2000 Judge
Survey #11
2000 Judge
Survey #5
2000 Judge
Survey #101
1999 Student
Survey #111

The unseemly haste to hire law clerks is a disgrace to the
federal bench.
The students think our hiring process is foolish. We are
presently embarrassing ourselves with our lack of selfcontrol.
The current approach reflects poorly on the judiciary.
I can't overstate how disillusioned, disgusted and depressed the whole clerkship application system has left me
.... [W]atching federal judges panic and lie [and] having

1999 Student
Survey #154'

2000 Student
Survey #6

2000 Student
Survey #43
1999 Student
Survey #104

interviews canceled after traveling to New York makes me
clearly realize that this system needs reform.
Some judges scrapped decorum and even bare civility.
One federal district court judge asked a student to sneak
into his office on a Sunday in January, through the service
entrance. His court had agreed not to conduct early interviews, he explained, and he wanted to cheat in secret.
Federal judges (many of them) suffer from immaturity,
unprofessionalism, and egotism that I guess should be expected from life-tenured government employees who have
no incentive to behave like adults.
The gamesmanship that currently pervades the process is
incredibly frustrating to students and ... corrosive of the
dignity of the federal judiciary.
I accepted an interview offer with a judge on the West
Coast and flew out at considerable expense. At the end of
the interview, it became evident that the judge had already
made enough outstanding offers to fill his slots. I believe
that he interviewed me as a 'backup.'

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys; 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys.
a This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written about the
market for federal judicial law clerks.
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The comments in Table 15 are obviously anecdotal and should be
viewed as such. At the same time, however, quantitative data from our
judge surveys make clear that the underlying forms of judicial behavior noted in the table are far from isolated. The practice of interviewing candidates (at the candidates' expense) when no slots remain
available is far less rare than we would have guessed prior to the surveys. We would have guessed that this occurred only very occasionally;
indeed, one judge wrote in response to our inquiry about whether the
judge had at least one slot left by the time of the last scheduled' interview, "Yes, of course. What kind of a slug do you take me for?" 16
The numbers, however, show a striking number of self-confessed
"slugs." In 2000, 15 percent of responding judges had no slots available
by the time of their last scheduled interview with a candidate, as
shown in Table 16. Senior judges were more likely to have no slots left
than active judges, as the table shows, but still, in both 1999 and 2000,
almost one in ten active judges admitted to having no slots available
by the time of their last scheduled interview. Some judges presumably
cancel scheduled interviews once their slots are filled, but this may or
may not spare the candidate the expense of a fruitless trip depending
on the refundability of the candidate's airplane ticket.
TABLE 16
JUDGES WHO HAD

No SLOTS LEFT BY THE TIME

OF THEIR LAST SCHEDULED INTERVIEW
Group of federal appellate judges

All federal appellate judges
Active judges
Senior judges

% of responding judges with no
slots left by the time of their last
scheduled interview
1998-1999
1999-2000

11%
9%
13%

15%
9%
32%

Total number
of responses:

Total number
of responses:

139

110

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

The lack of open slots by the end of the interview period is a
natural tendency of a process under which the great majority of judges
start making offers before completing their interviews. In both 1999
and 2000, approximately three-quarters of active judges responding to
our surveys had made at least some offers before the completion of
56

2000 Judge Survey #90.
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interviews, as shown in Table 3 above. We do not mean to suggest that
offering some positions before the end of interviewing is necessarily
objectionable, but it does obviously mean that those interviewing
later-who may be paying large sums to travel to the interview-are
competing for fewer and fewer positions.
Students responding to our surveys expressed not only direct
concerns about judges' conduct but also a general disenchantment
(voiced in no uncertain terms) with the clerk hiring process. Tables 171 and 17-2 provide a sampling of some of the most striking comments.
Of course, these responses may not represent a random slice of student opinion; presumably we were more likely to hear from students
dissatisfied with the process than from those who were pleased with it.
At the same time, it is critical to emphasize that, as the right-hand column of the tables reveals, the sources of the negative student comments appear generally to have been quite successful in the clerkship
market. This is particularly clear for 1999, when we asked for detailed
information about the judges from whom the student received offers.
Our measure for 2000-the total number of offers the student received-is less informative, but it still seems noteworthy that none of
the students quoted failed to receive at least one clerkship offer. Thus,
this is not a group of disgruntled students who received no clerkship
offers or (at least insofar as 1999 reveals) only offers from relatively
unappealing judges.
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TABLE 17-1
STUDENT REACTIONS TO THE LAW CLERK MARKET

Survey
Survey
#184

Survey
#119

Comment
It's terrible. Just about anything,
including malicious lies, forcible
running with scissors, and active
misuse of electric cords, would be
better.
Craziness.

Survey
#172

Insane.

Survey
#178

Chaotic.

Survey
#168

Brutal.

Survey
#123

A total mess.

(1998-1999)

Student's Outcome
No offer.

Two offers from
highly prestigious
court of appeals
Judges.
Three offers from
highly prestigious
court of appeals
judges.
Three offers from
top district court
judges in Washington D.C. and New
York City.
Offer from a highly
prestigious court of
appeals judge.
Offers from three
prestigious court of
appeals and district
court judges.

Survey
#121

[A] complete mess.

Source: 1999 Student Survey.

Offers from four
prestigious Second
Circuit judges.
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TABLE 17-2
STUDENT REACTIONS TO THE LAW CLERK MARKET

Survey
Survey
#26

Comment
You will have to arrest me before
I will again set foot in [specified
courthouse]. I would not wish

(1999-2000)

Student's Outcome
One offer.

this process on my worst enemy.

Survey
#9
Survey
#20
Survey
#21
Survey

One of the most arbitrary and illdesigned processes I've ever
come across.
A crap shoot.

One offer.

Horrible.

Two offers.

Chaos.

Two offers.

Absolute hell.

One offer.

Crazy.

Two offers.

Disorganized and chaotic.

Two offers.

A zoo.

Two offers.

A mess.

One offer.

The clerkship hiring process is a
disgrace. It is everything that we
are taught at law school to dislike: inefficient, arbitrary and capricious and designed to benefit
those with connections and inside
information.
Deeply unfair.

One offer.

An extremely unpleasant process.
Terrible.

One offer.

One offer.

#25

Survey
#28

Survey
#32
Survey
#40
Survey
#200
Survey
#234
Survey
#240

Survey

One offer.

#245

Survey
#246
Survey

Three offers.

#247

Survey
#252

Totally outrageous,... stressful
[and] chaotic.

Two offers.
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TABLE 17-2
STUDENT REACTIONS TO THE LAW CLERK MARKET

(1999-2000)

(CONTINUED)

Survey
Survey
#255

Comment
Clerkship hiring is like flying
through the air without a net, you
never know where you'll land,
and how hurt you'll be in the

Student's Outcome
One offer.

process.
Source: 2000 Student Survey.

Almost as interesting as some of the quotations in Tables 17-1
and 17-2 was the following remark from a student who had a more
positive view of the clerkship hiring process: "I think it benefits law
students at privileged schools to be subjected to the same random, difficult job search process that people in other fields have to [undergo].' Perhaps that is the best argument to be made for the current
process, but it does not suggest that this process is one that is likely to
cast the federal judiciary in a particularly favorable light.
3. Perceived fairness.
As noted in Part I above, participants may regard the law clerk
market as unfair to the extent that the frenzied manner and early timing of hiring lead the market to rely on various forms of personal wellconnectedness in matching applicants and judges. Students with relationships to previous high achievers in the legal world and elsewhere
may be advantaged in the clerkship competition as a result of the limited information available to judges. Our survey results provide evidence both that personal well-connectedness does matter in at least
some cases and that some students (and judges) regard this as unfair.
Note that our claim is not that such reliance is "unfair" (however defined) but simply that some participants in this market regard it as
such and experience disutility as a result. Also, it may be that any
process would be regarded as unfair by some, but the fairness objections we describe below appear to be shared by a larger group than
would probably be the case under a different system.
a) Peer recommendations. An intriguing feature of the market for
federal judicial law clerks is the role played by other students' and recent graduates' recommendations. In some instances clerks or judges
solicit the opinions of applicants' current classmates, as reflected in the
57 2000 Student Survey #264.
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survey comments reported in Table A10 in the Data Appendix. These
comments show both that peer references from current classmates matter in this market and that at least some students regard this as unfair.
At least as important as recommendations from current classmates
are recommendations from recent law school graduates who are currently clerking. Our 1999 and 2000 judge surveys show that two-thirds
of responding judges (67 percent in 1999 and 66 percent in 2000) use
current clerks to screen applications. Table 18 shows that, at least
anecdotally, current clerks may rely in part on their personal
connections in performing the screening function. Interestingly, at least
two of the students quoted in the table (the third and eleventh
quotations) seemed to regard the effect of the personal connection as
unfair even though they were presumably helped by it.
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TABLE 18
THE ROLE OF CONNECTIONS WITH CURRENT LAW CLERKS
Survey
1999 Survey #109

1999 Survey #160

1999 Survey #163

1999 Survey #134

1999 Survey #115

1999 Survey #49
1999 Survey #55

2000 Survey #5

2000 Survey #12

2000 Survey #20

2000 Survey #32

Comment
With [a particular judge] one of his clerks I knew
from law school. The judge made it clear that this
clerk was rooting for me.
I have a good friend clerking for [a particular judge]
who thought we would be a good fit-I'm sure her
influence was helpful.
I know the current clerks of [two particular judges
with whom the candidate received interviews]. Both
have assured me that I received interviews on my
merits .... That's what they say, but I can't help but
feel like perhaps they had some influence.
A current clerk [of a judge from whom the student
received an offer] is an acquaintance of mine and
helped get me an interview.
Current clerks in [two particular judges' chambers,
who were graduates of the candidate's law school,
played an important role]. I am pretty sure they had
good things to say about me to their respective
judges.
A [clerk for a particular judge] helped me get an interview.
[Knowing a current clerk for a particular judge]
probably expedited my ability to get the interview
[with that judge].
[T]wo current clerks with whom I had worked either
called me for an interview with their judge or recommended me to another judge in the same circuit.
I knew the current clerk of a judge who interviewed
me, I'm sure that clerk played a role in my getting
the interview.
I was acquainted with one of the clerks currently
working for [a judge from whom this candidate received a clerkship offer].
I think there would have been no chance of me interviewing with [a particular judge] if a friend of
mine hadn't been one of her clerks. That made it all
the more satisfying when I [later] got an interview
with [a different judge] whom I know I have no contact with.
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TABLE 18
THE ROLE OF CONNECTIONS WITH CURRENT LAW CLERKS

(CONTINUED)

2000 Survey #251

Comment
The two appellate and six SDNY [Southern District

2000 Survey #254
2000 Survey #10

of New York] interviews were all with judges with
whom I had some connection through their clerks.
I know, and was not hurt by, a current clerk.
One current clerk for [a particular judge] used to be

Survey

an acquaintance at school. I think he helped get me
an interview.
Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys.

b) Faculty "clerkship brokers." Clearly law professors play an

important role in the clerkship process; their recommendations of
students are a significant component in judges' evaluation of applicants,
as shown in Table All in the Data Appendix. No one seems to regard
that in itself as unfair. But sometimes the role of the faculty member
goes beyond the familiar role of recommender. In some instances
professors play the role of "interview broker" or "offer broker" in the
clerkship market or even choose the clerks themselves. This is reflected
in the comments from our student and judge surveys reported in Table
A12 in the Data Appendix; it is also reflected more quantitatively in
responses to our judge surveys, which showed that approximately 27
percent of judges in 1999 and 19 percent in 2000 relied on professors to
screen applications.
At least some students and judges seem to regard the sort of
"faculty feeding" described in our student and judge surveys as unfair:
I am and was completely repulsed by the "this professor secretly
handpicks and recommends a favorite student to a particular
judge" routine.8
[T]he biggest problem ... for students [is] the old boy's network.

If you are not the darling of an aged white male professor, who
may be severely uncomfortable working with talented women or
people of color, you should kiss your chances of a clerkship
goodbye and not bother applying. In my [particular school] class,
approximately 80% of the students who received circuit court
clerkships "applied" as [a] formality only, their clerkships were
delivered to them by 2 or 3 faculty members.9
58
59

2000 Student Survey #16.
2000 Student Survey #251.
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The "special deals" between judges and professors violate the
spirit if not the letter of attempts to hire in a more orderly way.c) Other forms of well-connectedness. Social connections may
also aid some applicants, and again this may be regarded as unfair. Table 19 lists student comments suggesting the importance of various
forms of social well-connectedness, including connections with friends
of a judge or a judge's former clerks. Some participants in the market
are likely to view the role of such connections as unfair; as one student
lamented, "I feel that I was not a party to the network."'"
TABLE 19
THE ROLE OF VARIOUS TYPES OF SOCIAL CONNECTIONS

Survey
1999 Survey #177

1999 Survey #120

Comment
A good family friend called [a particular judge], and
I received a call from the judge about thirty minutes
thereafter. [The student ultimately received an offer
from this judge.]
[A] close friend of [a particular judge] made a call
on my behalf.

1999 Survey #129

A former [clerk for a particular judge] called [that
judge] to recommend me. I think I was [that judge's]
top ...
choice based on that clerk's recommendation.

1999 Survey #130

A former clerk of [a particular judge] is a good
friend of mine, and played a big role.

1999 Survey #189
2000 Survey #7

With [a particular judge] a family connection helped.
A former clerk who knew me well called her judge
for me.

2000 Survey #11

2000 Survey #12
2000 Survey #59
2000 Survey #234

Got an interview (and the offer) in [specified court]
because old college friend was ex clerk and talked
me up to judge.
One of my best friend's [sic] father is a law professor
and he put in a call for me to a judge he knows.
A friend of my mother's put in a good word with a
judge they knew.
The clerkship I eventually accepted was offered after a professor at another law school (who I know
well) made a phone call to the judge.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys.

60
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1999 Judge Survey #26.
2000 Student Survey #24.
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In short, the law clerk market appears to rely heavily on various
forms of personal well-connectedness, and at least some participants
seem to regard this as unfair.
III. THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER MARKETS
The market for federal judicial law clerks is far from alone in its
difficulty in establishing the timing of transactions, with the variety of
efficiency and other problems that result. Table 20 below lists several
dozen markets and submarkets that have experienced the unraveling of
transaction dates. Table 20 concentrates primarily on markets that, like
the law clerk market, are entry-level professional labor markets. Timing
problems are particularly easy to identify in these markets because
generally employment cannot begin until the professional has completed his or her education, yet arrangements may be made far in advance.
Timing problems are not restricted to labor markets, however. The
list in Table 20 includes the market for postseason college football
bowls; again timing problems are easy to identify here, since postseason
bowl games cannot be played until the end of the regular season. Another good example of timing problems in a nonlabor context is fraternity and sorority rush, where recruitment had at one point moved back
to the pre-college years even though the activities of the organization in
2
question did not commence until college. Yet another example is early
admission to college; nearly three-quarters of high school students who
go on to attend elite colleges now apply for early admission to one or
more colleges in response to incentives offered by colleges.

See Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1019 (cited in note 3). Indeed, here the unraveling
62
of selection dates has even entered the language in the form of the term "rush." See Susan Mongell
and Alvin E. Roth, Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism, 81 Am Econ Rev 441,441
(1991).
See Christopher Avery, Andrew Fairbanks, and Richard Zeckhauser, The Early Admis63
sions Game: The Perspective of Participants(work in progress) (on file with authors).
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TABLE 20
A SELECTION OF MARKETS WITH TIMING PROBLEMS

Market

Organization

Stage'

Entry-Level Medical Labor

Market:
American first-year
National Resident Matching
postgraduate (PGY1) positions Program (NRMP)
Canadian first-year positions
U.K. regional markets for
preregistration positions:
Edinburgh
Cardiff
Birmingham
Newcastle
Sheffield
Cambridge
London Hospital
American specialty residencies:
Neurosurgery
Ophthalmology
Otolaryngology
Neurology
Urology
Other specialtiesb

3

Canadian Intern and Resident
Matching Service
Regional health authorities

3

3
3
4,1
4,1
3 or 4,1
3
3

Neurological Surgery Matching
Program
Ophthalmology Matching Program
Otolaryngology Matching Program
Neurology Matching Program
AUA Residency Matching Program
NRMP
3

Advanced specialty positions:
Twelve (primarily surgical) Specialties Matching Services
specialties'
Medical
Medical Specialties Matching
Program
Subspecialties:
Four ophthalmology
Ophthalmology Fellowship Match
subspecialties
Plastic surgery
Plastic Surgery Matching Program

4
3
3
3
3
and 4

3
3

3
3

'The "stages" are explained in the text just below.
bAnesthesiology, emergency medicine, orthopedics, physical
medicine, psychiatry, and diagnostic
radiology.
'Colon/rectal surgery, dermatology, emergency medicine, foot/ankle surgery, hand surgery, ophthalmic plastic and reconstructive surgery, pediatric emergency medicine, pediatric orthopedics,
pediatric surgery, reproductive endocrinology, sports medicine, and vascular surgery.
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TABLE 20
A SELECTION OF MARKETS WITH TIMING PROBLEMS

(CONTINUED)
Market
Entry-Level Legal Labor
Markets:
Federal court clerkships
Canadian articling
positions:
Toronto
Vancouver

Organization

Judicial Conferences
Articling Student Matching
Program

id

New MBA's

1

Ministry of Labor; Nikkeiren

Clinical psychology
internships

Association of Psychology Postdoctoral & Internship Centers'

Dental residencies
(three specialties and
other general programs)

Postdoctoral Dental Matching
Program

Optometry residencies

Optometric Residency Matching
Services
National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCA A")

PostseasonCollege Football
Bowls
Other Two-Sided Matching:
Fraternity rush
Sorority rush

2, then 1

3 and 4
3 or 4,
then 1
3

Alberta (Calgary)
Entry-Level Business School
Markets:
New marketing professors
Other Entry-Level Labor Markets:
Japanese university
graduates

Stage

National Panhellenic Conference

2

2, then 3

3

1 and 3
1, then
3
1
3

Source: Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 993 (cited in note 3).
Occasionally.
'The name of this organization used to be "Association of Psychology Internship Centers."

In many of the markets in Table 20, considerable effort has been
expended to halt, reverse, or otherwise control the timing of transactions. The table lists for many of the markets the organization that has
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been entrusted with this task. Many of these organizations were created expressly for the purpose of controlling the unraveling of transaction times. In many instances these organizations can bring to bear
considerable compulsory power. But frequently a solution to the timing problem has nonetheless proved elusive. The difficulties encountered by these other markets may therefore illuminate the problems
in the market for federal judicial law clerks and the prospects and potential pitfalls in the road to reform of this market.
A. A Framework: Four Stages of Unraveling Markets
To make it easy to describe the common phenomena found in a diverse set of markets, Table 20 loosely categorizes each market it describes as most recently being in one of four "stages," as follows.64
Markets that are in the process of unraveling-in which appointment dates are getting earlier from year to year, or in which they
have moved to the earliest feasible date -are stage one markets. Here
is a generic description of stage one:
Stage 1 begins when ... the relatively few transactions [in the

market] are made without overt timing problems. By the middle

of stage 1 ... some appointments are being made rather early,

with some participants finding that they don't have as wide a
range of choices as they would like: students have to decide
whether to accept early job offers or take a chance and wait for
better jobs, and some employers find that not all of the students
they are interested in are available by the time they get around to
making offers. The trade journals start to be full of exhortations
urging employers to wait until the traditional time to make offers,
or at least not to make them any earlier next year than this year.
Towards the end of stage 1,the rate of unraveling accelerates, until sometimes quite suddenly offers are being made so early that
there are serious difficulties distinguishing among the candidates.
There is no uniform time for offers to be made nor is there a
customary duration for them to be left open, so participants find
themselves facing unnaturally thin markets, and on both sides of
the market a variety of strategic behaviors emerge, many of
which are regarded as unethical practices. Various organizations
concerned with the market may have proposed guidelines intended to regulate it, without notable success. As stage 1 ends, influential market participants are engaged in a vigorous debate
about what can and should be done.65
64
65

This section draws from Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 996-98 (cited in note 3).
Id at 996.
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Although this was not written as a description of the law clerk market,
it fits it to a "T."
Stage two markets are those that have instituted regulations specifying the time before which offers and sometimes other contacts cannot
be made, and sometimes how long offers must remain open. Stage two
markets are still decentralized, with employers contacting potential employees directly to make offers. During each of the six attempted reforms of the law clerk market, this market was in stage two. For instance, the most recent attempted reform specified February 1 as the
date before which contacts could not be made and March 1 as the date
before which (in effect) offers could not be made.66
Stage three markets are those that have instituted centralized
market clearing procedures, which not only serve to determine the
time at which transactions take place but also organize the transactions (the order in which offers are made and the point at which
transactions are finalized). The most common form of stage three organization has potential employers and employees contacting each
other (via applications, interviews, etc.) in a decentralized way, after
which each employer submits a rank ordering of applicants to a central clearinghouse, to which each applicant also submits a rank ordering of positions. 7 The clearinghouse then uses these preference lists, in
some pre-specified way (now often formalized in a computer program), to produce a match, and employers and employees are informed of the results of the match.6 Perhaps the largest and best
known of the centralized markets is the one by which new medical
school graduates are matched to first-year residencies. 6 But, as Table
20 makes clear, lawyers too participate in stage three markets; "articling" positions required before being called to the bar in Canada are
arranged in this way in several major cities.
Stage four markets are those with centralized mechanisms, but in
which there has been at least some unraveling prior to the centralized
market, as participants jockey for advantage in the centralized procedure.
[T~he unraveling has often taken the form of recruiting students
for summer internships (or in the case of some medical specialties for 'audition electives'), which amount to extensive interviewing opportunities in which the student spends a period of
66 Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 209-15 (cited in note 8), describe the six attempted reforms. As discussed in Part IV.B.I.a below, the March 1 date specified by the most recent
reform technically applied to interviews, but most, although not all, judges are reluctant to hire
without an interview.
67
Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 997 (cited in note 3).
68 Id.
See Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 748 (cited in note 9).
69
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weeks or even months at the firm. Because of the length of time
involved, students can interview in this way at only a very small
number of firms ... and firms can interview only a few students

in this way. Because the percentage of new employees hired by
each firm who were previously summer interns there sometimes
becomes quite high, these internships can become a way of moving the recruiting process before the centralized matching
mechanism. '°
These four stages provide a framework within which to discuss the
particular markets from Table 20 in more detail. In the next section we
offer some vignettes from those other markets in the hope that they
will illuminate the problems experienced in the market for federal judicial law clerks.
B.

Vignettes

1. Medical residencies.
A good place to begin is with the history of the market for new
American medical school graduates, both because that is the first of
these "unraveling" markets to have been studied as such by economists7' and because of its role (discussed more fully in Parts IV.C and
IV.D below) in the debate over how to reform the clerkship market. 2
But it is not the successful experience of the centralized stage three
medical market that we wish to discuss here but, instead, the period
from 1945 to 1951, when the medical market was organized as a stage
two market.
Prior to 1945 there had been a severe unraveling of appointment
dates, so that medical students were being selected for postgraduation employment when they still had two full years remaining
of medical school (much like today's market for federal judicial law
clerks). 73 In 1945 the medical schools, working in conjunction with the
residency programs, successfully implemented an embargo on letters
of reference until a specified date, and this proved effective. 4 The date
70
71

Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 997 (cited in note 3).
See Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents:A

Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J Pol Econ 991 (1984).
72
See Annette E. Clark, On ComparingApples and Oranges: The Judicial Clerk Selection
Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 Georgetown L J 1749, 1753-97 (1995); Kozinski, 100
Yale L J at 1721-24 (cited in note 1);Trenton H. Norris, The Judicial Clerkship Selection Process:An
Applicant's Perspective on BadApples, Sour Grape's and Fruitful Reform, 81 Cal L Rev 765,791-98
(1993); Oberdorfer and Levy, 101 Yale L J at 1098-1108 (cited in note 41); Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at
160-63 (cited in note 2). Several of these authors have cited the economic investigation into the
medical market in support of their (opposing) positions on reform of the clerkship market. See
Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1721 n 29; Oberdorfer and Levy, 101 Yale L J at 1100-01 n 15,1103 n 27.
73 Roth, 92 J Pol Econ at 994 (cited in note 71).
74 Id.
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of appointment was successfully moved to one year before employment would begin, and in subsequent years the dates at which letters
were released, and appointments made, were moved into the last year
of medical school, nearer to the time of appointment."
But the problems experienced by this market did not end when
the appointment date was controlled (a stage-two-type solution).
There followed a period in which the market was extremely disorderly, with students being called upon to make increasingly prompt
decisions whether to accept offers. In 1945 offers were supposed to
remain open for ten days." Each subsequent year that interval was
shortened, until by 1949 a grace period of twelve hours had been rejected as too long, and exploding offers were explicitly allowed." What
had happened was that hospitals found that if an offer was rejected
very near the deadline, it was often too late for them to reach their
next most preferred candidates before they had accepted other offers. Even when there was a long deadline, much of this action was
compressed into the last moments, since a student who had been offered a position at, say, his or her third choice hospital would be inclined to wait as long as possible before accepting, in the hope of
eventually being offered a preferable position. 9
A central clearinghouse was proposed and adopted only when
these attempts to organize a stage two market had been exhausted./
With modifications, this kind of central clearinghouse has been used
now in the medical residency market for almost half a century. The design of the current medical clearinghouse was directed by one of the
work,' and its details are discussed more fully in Parts
authors of this below.
IV.C and IV.D
2. Postseason college bowls.
The American medical market is large and impersonal, and one
important feature of this market, both before and after the move to a
centralized clearinghouse, is that informal understandings between participants are not always honored. But in smaller markets, in which participants can expect to encounter each other again at later points in
time, promises can often be relied on. Paradoxically (since one would
Id.
Id at 994-95.
77 See id at 995 (describing the decision of the Association of American Medical Colleges
to permit offers at 12:01 a.m. on a specified date with no required waiting period for responses).
78 Id at 994.
79 Id.
80 See id at 995-96 (describing the adoption of the matching system for the 1951-1952
market for medical residents).
81 See Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 748 (cited in note 9).
75

76
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ordinarily think that a small market would make an agreement on a
fixed starting date for transactions easier to sustain), the small size can
further increase the difficulty of achieving a stage two solution.
The experience of postseason college football bowls is illustrative.
For many years the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") attempted to control the date at which bowl agreements
were signed by specifying a date (commonly called "Pick-Em Day")
before which such agreements were forbidden. The idea was to delay
selection until sufficiently late in the regular season that teams with
the best regular-season records would be likely to be matched against
one another in the bowls.& However, despite the considerable penalties the NCAA can levy on teams and bowls, the fact that informal
agreements could be relied upon allowed teams and bowls to make
early agreements and avoid penalties.During the 1990-1991 football season there were highly
publicized informal agreements, four weeks before the end of the
regular season (and two weeks before Pick-Em Day), which sent
Notre Dame to the Orange Bowl, Miami to the Cotton Bowl, and Virginia to the Sugar Bowl. At that time (with four games left to play)
Notre Dame, Miami, and Virginia were ranked by the sportswriters'
poll as the number one, three, and eight teams in the nation." But, following some losses before the bowl games were actually played, Notre
Dame had dropped from number one to number five, and Virginia
had dropped out of the top twenty altogether.' Because of the significant penalties associated with breaking NCAA rules, there are no
public accounts of the details of these informal agreements.' However,
"in confidential discussions with participants in this market, great confidence was expressed in the reliability of such agreements, once
made. '
The NCAA gave up trying to enforce a date for bowl agreements
following the embarrassing experience in the 1990-1991 season.9O
Since then bowl selection has become more centrally organized (a
stage three model), based on agreements between consortia of football conferences and independent teams and consortia of bowls." Thus,

Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1009 (cited in note 3).
Id at 1008-09.
84 Id at 1009-12.
85 Id at 1009.
86 Id at 1009-10.
87
Id at 1012.
88 Id at 1012 n 22.
89
Id.
90 Id at 1012.
91 See id at 1013.
82

83
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as with the medical market, the attempt at a stage two solution proved
infeasible, and a more centralized mechanism was adopted.
3. Clinical psychology positions.
One of the longest-running stage two markets was the American
market for pre- and post-doctoral internships for clinical psychologists,
which operated as a stage two market from the 1970s through the 19971998 academic year.9' In this market, transactions were all to be made
by telephone on "Selection Day" (akin to Pick-Em Day'3 ), a specified
date of each year.9 The rules required that no offers be made before the
opening time of the market (9:00 a.m. Central Standard Time in the
early 1990s), and that all offers made during the course of the market
and not yet rejected remain open until the closing time (4:00 p.m. Central Standard Time in the early 1990s).' Thus, "both early offers and 'exploding offers' (which require a decision before the end of the market)
[we]re not allowed."'
This market survived for roughly twenty-five years despite a certain level of noncompliance, with somewhere between 10 percent and
25 percent of students reporting forbidden contacts from employers
before the start of Selection Day and with reports also of informal
pressure to signal in advance that if offered a job the candidate would
accept it." Various rules were formulated to discourage such forms of
behavior, but these too were difficult to enforce.98 Both the early contacts and the solicitation of promises seemed to be related to the fact
that employers had good reason to try to avoid making offers that
might be rejected late in the day on Selection Day. The reason is that,
at 4:00 p.m., students who had offers in hand would accept them before they expired, so that a firm that had an offer rejected just before
then might find that many of its more preferred alternate candidates
had already accepted positions before they could be contacted. Observations of this market and interviews with participants suggest that,
in deciding to whom to make offers, employers were substantially influenced by which students had indicated in advance that they would
accept, and that, knowing this, students very often made such an indi-

92 See Roth and Xing, 105 J Pol Econ at 285 (cited in note 20); Jamie Chamberlin, Would-be
Interns Hopeful about 'Matchmaker'Selection System: New System Could EliminatePitfalls ofthe
Old Process,29 APA Monitor (Oct 1998), available online at <http://www.apa.org/monitor/oct98/
intem.html> (visited Apr 20,2001).
93 See text accompanying note 82.
94 Roth and Xing, 105 J Pol Econ at 285 (cited in note 20).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1017 (cited in note 3).
98 Id.
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cation to some employer.99 Early contacts and promises had much less
force in the market for medical residencies prior to the move to a
stage three solution, despite the similar congestion problems that existed, because (among other things) the size of the market means that
a student who breaks an informal promise in the medical market may
never have to deal again with the residency director who elicited it. In
the clinical psychology market, by contrast, promises are reliable,
since, as one program director said to one of us (Roth), "You see these
people again.

''

As a result of these problems, the clinical psychology market converted recently to a centralized clearinghouse, modeled on the
medical market but adapted to the special features of the clinical psychology market. This centralized market ran for the first time in academic year 1998-1999."" So, once again, the market moved from stage
two (which proved unsuccessful) to stage three.
4. Japanese university graduates.
Yet another example of a stage two market is the market for
graduates of elite Japanese universities. '° The unraveling in this market is so persistent and widespread that it has a popular name, aotagai, which translates as "harvesting rice while it is still green.'. 3
Although hiring before specified dates is formally prohibited, hiring well in advance of graduation nevertheless persists through informal but effective guarantees of employment known as naitei.2° These
informal arrangements are similar to the understandings that brought
down the stage two approaches in the college football and clinical
psychology markets.
After a company has offered naitei to a particular candidate, the
informal agreement is enforced through an interesting mechanism.
Companies that offer naitei to students long before the beginning of
employment try to prevent them, via physical restraint, from interviewing with other companies or government ministries.' 5 For example, a company might invite all of the students to whom it had offered
naitei to come to the company on the day the Finance Ministry was offering its civil service exam, with the understanding that the guarantee
99 See Roth and Xing, 105 J Pol Econ at 289-90 (cited in note 20) (describing a 1993 selection day where the clinical psychology program directors extended offers to less preferred candidates who had given oral assurances that they would accept the offers immediately).
100 Id at 289 n 6.
101 See Chamberlin, 29 APA Monitor (cited in note 92).
102 Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1015-16 (cited in note 3).
103 Id at 1015.
104
105

Id.
See id at 1016 & n 35.
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of employment would be withdrawn from any student who failed to
show up."'

Naitei, then, is a very effective means of making arrangements
prior to the official date allowed in this stage two market. Despite the
effectiveness of naitei, this market has continued to be organized (officially) as a stage two market, although in its practical effects it is probably more akin to a stage one market as a result of the role of naitei.
5. Canadian articling positions.
Canadian law graduates take an "articling" position following
graduation and before being called to the bar. ° The various regional
markets for articling slots have been subject to unraveling, just as has
the American market for federal judicial law clerks. In response to
this problem, two of the articling markets, in Toronto, Ontario, and in
Alberta (primarily in Calgary), are now organized as stage three markets employing an algorithm developed in part by one of the present
authors initially for the medical match." As described above, stage
three markets are ones in which matching of applicants to positions
occurs through a centralized clearinghouse. Participation in the articling clearinghouses is by a subset of the firms in each regional market; some firms in each market do not participate. "
A centralized matching system solves one of the fundamental
problems with a stage two solution, which is that congestion may occur on the start date. (Recall that this was the reason for the move to a
stage three solution in the market for medical residency positions.)
But the problem of implied or informal agreements in circumvention
of the centralized clearinghouse remains. "Offers" and "acceptances"
may be communicated outside the match with one side telling the
other, "I'll rank you first in the match if you rank me first." This effectively moves the match date earlier, even if there is 100 percent pro
forma participation in the centralized process. Applicants and firms will
simply submit forms requesting to be matched with the parties with
whom they had already agreed months in advance. This is by no means
an academic problem; in some failed matches, up to 80 percent of the

Id.
See id at 1024.
108 Id.
109 See Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 748 (cited in note 9) (medical match algorithm).
110 See, for example, The Law Society of Upper Canada, Procedures Governing the Recruitment of Articling Students for the 2001-2002 Articling Term A.6, available online at
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/services-articlingproc2OOl-en.shtml> (visited Jan 18, 2001).
106
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matching forms submitted to the centralized mechanism list only one
partner, making clear that everything has been settled in advance."'
The stage three market for articling positions in Canada has taken
a number of interesting steps to address the problem of informal
agreements. In the Toronto match there are detailed regulations governing the nature of permissible communications between candidates
and firms." ' The Law Society of Upper Canada regulations seek to
control the communication between firms and students both before
and after interviews occur. Recognizing that, in light of the incomplete
coverage of the centralized match and the fact that offers from nonparticipating firms may need to be acted upon before the match date,
it is impossible to eliminate completely the discussion of rank orderings among participants-but wishing to prevent students being pressured into "deals" that would subvert the intention of the match-the
regulations attempt to define and limit what kinds of communication
are allowed when firms and students discuss the upcoming match. The
regulations specify that firms may provide ranking information to students in advance of the match, but only within a specified time period.
As the regulations provide:
A.8. Subject to the exception noted below regarding summer
students, no communication of ranking intentions shall take place
prior to 8:00 a.m. on Monday, August 14,2000.
Exception: Firms in the matching program may communicate
ranking intentions to summer students employed with their firm
in the summer months of 2000 prior to Monday, August 14,
2000."'
The regulations further specify that students may, but cannot be required or pressured to, provide ranking information to firms:
A.9. Firms shall not request from a student, explicitly or implicitly, information on intentions as to where the student will rank
the firm.
Commentary: Voluntary communication of ranking intentions by
firms made in accordance with procedure A.8 will be permitted,
provided the manner of communication does not impose pressure on students to reciprocate with communication of their own
ranking intentions. For example, it is improper for a firm to say to
a student "we will rank you within the firm's complement of stu-

111 See Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1000 (cited in note 3).
112 See The Law Society of Upper Canada, Procedures Governing the Recruitment of Articling Students (cited in note 110).
113 Id at A.8 (emphasis omitted).
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dents in the match (or first, etc.) if you rank us, or tell us, or
commit to us, that you will rank us first."
A.11. Firms communicating ranking intentions to students ... are

strongly encouraged to communicate their ranking intentions using the terminology set out in the Society's "Guidelines for Firms
Participating in the Matching Program re: Communication of
Ranking Intentions to Articling Candidates.""
A major source of the pressure to communicate outside the
match in the articling market is the fact that some students have applied both to firms in the match and firms not in the match. Since
many more students participate in the match than there are positions
offered in the match, the intention of permitting firms to communicate
ranking information is to help students to decide whether or not to
accept an offer they may have received from a nonparticipating firm.
The centralized clearinghouse in the Canadian articling market
seems to be working, although the regulations also show that this
market requires some careful maintenance. The central remaining
problem with the Canadian articling match is the heavy reliance on
summer positions to "audition" articling candidates. In this respect the
market has sharp tendencies toward stage four unraveling. There is
significant interaction between the market for articling positions and
the market for summer associateships for students who have completed their second year of law school. This is not a recent development but rather one with which the articling market has dealt for a
long time. As a partner at the Toronto law firm of Blake, Cassels and
Graydon observed roughly a decade ago:
Students now feel virtually compelled to obtain a summer job in
Toronto after their second year in law school and as a result, a
substantial portion of the articling hiring process has now been
placed on the shoulders of the summer program. Students are being hired for summer positions halfway through their second year
in law school ....

Everyone recognizes that this is a back-door

method of obtaining an articling position. "'
The market for medical residencies is marked by the same stage
four tendencies in a number of subspecialties, as described just below.

Id at A.9, A.11 (emphasis omitted).
115 Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1024 (cited in note 3) (quoting correspondence from
Barry McGee to Alvin E. Roth, Mar 25,1991).
114
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6. Medical residencies (again).
As described above, the medical market adopted a centralized
clearinghouse after the failure to organize a successful stage two market
in the middle of this century. But, as in the Canadian articling market,
the selection process in certain medical subspecialties may in fact begin
well before the centralized match. In highly competitive areas such as
orthopedic surgery and neurosurgery, preference for residency positions
is often given to candidates who have done audition electives with the
program in question."6 These auditions last several weeks and give the
program and student a chance to become acquainted with one another
well in advance of the centralized match."' Since students can audition
with only a few programs, and programs can offer auditions to only a
few students, the auditions represent a form of "prematching," where
some selection occurs on both sides well before the centralized match."8
Note that sometimes (in other markets, including the American
market for new law school graduates) summer or "elective" positions
do not reflect efforts to circumvent stage three mechanisms. These positions may exist even in markets without a stage three (or stage two)
regime because they provide employers with useful information about
candidates, or candidates with useful information about employers,
prior to entry into a more permanent commitment. An obvious example here may be summer associate positions at American law firms;
these positions do not represent an attempt to "prematch" in advance
of a centralized procedure or specified offer date (since neither exists
in this market, although once an offer for a permanent associateshipwhich may be made at any time-is made, the National Association
for Law Placement regulates the amount of time for which it must be
kept open"9 ). Rather the summer associateship seems to be a way for
law firms to gather information about candidates and provide information to them about the firm. Interestingly, though, the dates of appointment for summer associateships at American law firms themselves have unraveled over the years;"O thus, instead of the summer associateship being a way around a mechanism adopted to control unraveling, the market for summer associateships is itself subject to unraveling.

See id at 1023.
Id.
118 Id at 1023-24.
119 See Principlesand Standards for Law Placement and Recruitment Activities, in National
Association for Law Placement, Member Handbook & Membership Directory 29, 33-34 (NALP
2000).
120 Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1004-05 (cited in note 3).
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IV. THREE DECREASINGLY MODEST PROPOSALS FOR GOVERNING
THE MARKET FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS-AND How

THEIR CHANCES OF SUCCESS CAN BE MADE LESS BLEAK

What can be done about the law clerk market? The possibilities
for reform (or not) are familiar from past experience and the existing
literature: (1) Let the market go without attempting to regulate it (so
that it will remain at stage one); (2) Establish a start date for offers and
perhaps also interviews (the stage two solution, tried several times in
the past); and (3) Institute a centralized clearinghouse (the stage three
approach). As noted above, because there is a range of existing opinion
on reform, we consider each of the three possibilities just described
rather than focusing on a single one. We attempt to describe how each
could best be implemented and what its odds of success are in light of
what we know from our empirical evidence about the law clerk market
and the experience of other markets. Ultimately we conclude that a
centralized matching system for those judges who wish their clerks to
be eligible for United States Supreme Court clerkships holds the most
hope for reforming the presently unraveling market.
A. The "Do Nothing" Approach: A Decentralized Market in Which
Participants Are Free to Act As They Wish
Despite what seems to be a reasonably broad consensus among
judges, clerks, and observers that the market for federal judicial law
clerks is not working particularly well, a number of judges responding
to our surveys expressed strong support, often in colorful terms, for the
"do nothing" approach. Their comments are summarized in Table 21.
These statements were not made in response to a specific question
about the desirability of regulation; they were offered in response to
an open-ended question asking judges whether there was anything
else they would like to share with us about their views of the law clerk
market.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:793

TABLE 21
JUDGES' CRITICISM OF EFFORTS TO REFORM THE MARKET FOR
FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS

Survey
1999 Survey #54

1999 Survey #51

1999 Survey #60
1999 Survey #12
1999 Survey #14

1999 Survey #37
1999 Survey #72

Comment
I think that it is a waste of time to try to devise
'systems' for this 'process'. I get excellent clerks in
the free market and I see no need for regulation
(but then I never do).
Cartels do not work. People cheat. Judges cheat.
Law schools cheat. Attempts at regulation are an
attempt by established eastern law schools, especially Harvard whose professors are conducting
this survey, to improve their lock on the market.
Is this an attempt to resurrect the 'East Coast Law
School Cabal?'
Forget it! Leave it up to the judges and the applicant when to interview, apply or hire.
The free market should govern the process. Government intervention is not justified. If judges
want to make offers on the basis of insufficient
data they should be free to do so. If students want
to accept clerkship offers after one day of law
school thereby passing up better opportunities
later, the market should allow them to do so.
I would leave it alone and just let judges and law
clerks do what they want to. Laissez faire.
I will refuse to be bound by any combination
agreement or conspiracy in restraint of trade. All
cures are worse than the "disease".... Leave it
alone and get out of our hair ....

1999 Survey #84f
2000 Survey #38

Free trade is the

best. I do not believe the system is either chaotic
or bad. Get off it.
I have no problems and would be happy if nobody
tries to impose rigid rules on me or anyone else.
[T]he less regulation[ ] the better. I have never
had any problem handling the process of hiring
law clerks... [T]he system is fine as it is.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
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What is likely to happen if, in accord with these sentiments, the
market is left unregulated?
1. Prognosis.
Grim. Hiring will continue to occur in a frenzied manner and is
likely to move back even further in the student's law school career, so
that even less information is available. As already noted, in 1999-2000
interviewing commenced in mid-fall of the second year of law school,
and there is no reason in principle why it could not move back until late
in the summer after the first year (when, indeed, travel for interviews
might be particularly easy); no new information emerges between the
late part of the summer (after spring grades, law review selection, and
references from professors for whom students may have worked as
summer research assistants become available) and the early to middle
fall. It is even possible that hiring would move back to the beginning of
the second semester of first year, by which time first-semester grades
would be available (except at Yale, where all first-semester classes are
pass-fail; Yale students would thus be at a significant disadvantage). The
good news is that clerkship hiring probably cannot move any earlier
than the first semester of law school.
2. Palliatives.
While we are waiting to see how early is early, judges could be encouraged to enter their hiring schedules in a generally available database. Indeed, an approach along these lines was instituted last year by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts."
An information database would, if there were a reasonable degree
of participation, and if participating judges provided accurate dates in a
timely manner, ameliorate some of the existing confusion about judges'
timing, and this would certainly be a valuable service. However, neither
of the two conditions just noted is likely to hold. The judges who move
early to gain a strategic advantage over other judges are unlikely to participate in a database for precisely the reasons that drive them to jump
the gun in the first place. If it is widely known that they are moving at a
given time, other judges are likely to move up their schedules in response, and this will reduce the competitive gain from going early. Consistent with this suggestion, relatively few court of appeals judges list
their hiring times in the Administrative Office database.
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See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Looking for a FederalClerkship? Look On-
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A further reason for limited participation is that once some judges
are not participating in the database, other judges will be reluctant to
commit to particular dates for hiring clerks because developments in
the market may cause them to want to move earlier; alternatively they
may specify particular dates in the database but then feel compelled to
move earlier as a result of changes in the market. Indeed, even without
a centralized database this sort of problem comes up. Before the creation of the Administrative Office database, chambers frequently told
law school placement offices that they would begin the hiring process
on a certain date but then departed from this date as changes occurred
elsewhere in the market. For all of these reasons, a centralized database
is unlikely to address the fundamental problems in the market for federal judicial law clerks.
B.

If at First You Don't Succeed, Try Again: Set Start Dates

If remaining in stage one seems unappealing, what about a stage
two solution? The key feature of a stage two approach would be that
some authority would set (1) a start date for offers, and perhaps also (2)
a start date for interviews, a length of time for which offers must be left
open, or both in an effort to govern the market for federal judicial law
clerks. Obviously various incarnations of this approach have been tried,
and have failed, on several past occasions in this market.' 1 Also, as the
vignettes above show, such approaches have been tried, and have failed,
in the markets for medical residencies, college football bowls, clinical
psychology positions, and Japanese university graduates. Indeed, many
of the markets listed in Table 20 have at some points in their history attempted to organize themselves as stage two markets but have failed
and either have slipped back into stage one or have adopted a more
centralized (stage three) organization.
The point is in fact very general: We are aware of no market that
has successfully organized itself as a stage two market for an extended
period without problems of the sort observed in the markets discussed
above. The clinical psychology market is the closest case, but even
there, as noted above, there were serious problems of congestion and
informal agreements prior to the specified Selection Day, and this
market has now moved to a stage three organization."'
Do the same factors that explain the failures of stage two approaches in the other markets explain the past failures in the law clerk
market? Might a new and improved stage two approach work in the
latter setting?
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1. Prognosis.
Grim. There are several problems, illuminated by the experiences
of the markets described in Part III.
a) Congestion. The first difficulty is that even if the start date
were fully adhered to by all parties (an unlikely outcome, as we discuss below), there would be severe congestion in the market on the
start date, and this would preclude participants from considering a
range of possible transactions before making their decisions. Our earlier discussion of the medical residency market in the late 1940s is illustrative; the reason that the stage two solution failed was not that
the start date was not adhered to, but that there was severe congestion
in the market on the start date.
Within the category of start-date regimes, there are two main approaches. Under the first, there is an offer start date and then either
an earlier start date or no start date for interviews. This was the situation in the clinical psychology market prior to the institution of the
centralized match. As described above, substantial congestion occurred on Selection Day in this market. Past reform efforts in the law
clerk market likewise demonstrate the problem. Judge Wald's account
of the 1989-1990 clerk market, when the Judicial Councils in many circuits had adopted a deadline of May I at noon (Eastern Standard
Time) for offers, with a consensus on a one-hour minimum response
time and no limits on interviews prior to May 1, is representative in its
essential features:
[T]he major complaint was the frenzy with which offers had to be
made and accepted. Those judges who gave their choices time to
reflect found themselves severely disadvantaged. The one-hour
window collapsed as applicants felt constrained to accept the first
offer tendered. A judge who did not get through to an applicant
at 12:00 noon was often too late. "I got my first choice," one judge
complained, "and, after that, having given the applicant a half
hour, I found my next 8 or 9 choices gone." By 12:15 virtually all
of the bidding in the D.C. Circuit was over. Between 12:00 and
12:15, judges were making offers on one line as calls came in on a
second from frantic applicants trying to learn if they were to24 get
an offer before they responded to the offer of another judge.
Congestion problems of this sort are likely to be severe in markets
with offer start dates and earlier, or no, start dates for interviews.
The second possible approach is to have the offer start date also be
the interview start date. This was effectively the situation under the
most recent attempted reform of the law clerk market, under which in124
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terviews were not supposed to occur (under a "nonbinding" Judicial
Conference guideline) prior to March 1.25' Under this guideline there
was no official regulation of offer times, but one presumes that most
judges would not hire applicants for "the most intense and mutually
dependent [relationship] I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or
a love affair"'26 without an interview, although a few judges do take this
route.27
The difficulty with requiring a common start date for interviews
and offers is that neither judges nor students will be able to conduct or
participate in many interviews. The experience with the March 1 regime was that "both interviews and offers bunched around the March
1 date, so students had little latitude in scheduling interviews""' and
little opportunity to interview with a range of judges (and conversely
so for the judges).
b) Cheating. Alongside congestion, the second and equally fundamental problem with a stage two solution is that it is virtually impossible to prevent defections from the specified start date. This has
happened before in the law clerk market, and it is the overwhelming
consensus of judges that it would happen again. Both our 1999 and
our 2000 surveys posed the following question to judges: "If the Judicial Conference established, by rule, a firm start-date for interviews of
September 1 of the third year of law school, do you believe that all or
virtually all court of appeals judges would adhere to this date (in spirit
as well as in letter)?" 72 percent of responding judges in 1999, and 74
percent in 2000, stated that they did not believe all or virtually all of
their colleagues would adhere. Our survey showed that most judges
say they are willing to comply if others are (93 percent in 1999, and 92
percent in 2000), but the problem is that they do not believe that most
others will comply.
The problem is the familiar one of trying to sustain a selfenforcing cartel-one in which there is no outside sanction for defection. In general a cartel is much easier to sustain if strong outside
sanctions exist to punish defectors. In the case of ordinary cartels, antitrust law denies enforcement of any explicit agreements, thereby
eliminating most of the effective outside means of sanctioning those
who defect. Likewise in the context of a start date for the law clerk
market, the ability of some central authority to mete out punishments
to judges who defect is limited by the institutional constraints surrounding the judiciary. Particularly because cheating may be far from
explicit (as discussed below), it is difficult to imagine draconian pun125
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ishments being handed out to Article III judges. The lack of explicitness, as well as other factors, likewise make it difficult to imagine
handing out strong punishments to clerkship applicants who were interviewed or hired before the specified date.
So only a self-enforcing arrangement among judges is realistically
possible. But of course the difficulty of sustaining such an arrangement is well known. The problem is particularly acute in the clerkship
context, since parties cannot compensate those who are disadvantaged
by the arrangement for their losses. In an ordinary cartel, conflicts of
interest among members, if they exist, can be smoothed over by compensation; for instance, a seller who would prefer a higher price than
the other members of the cartel can be given a larger sales quota. But
there is no obvious way for a judge who is disserved by a given start
date to be compensated for the losses he or she would incur from
compliance with that date.
It is clear that some judges lose from specified start dates. Obviously, those judges who wish to gain a strategic advantage over other
judges by jumping the gun are disadvantaged. This is related to our
earlier observation that the unregulated market is unlikely to be
Pareto inefficient: at least a few judges are likely to be made worse off
if the bargaining gain they enjoy from jumping the gun in an unregulated market is eliminated.29

But other judges would want to defect as well; this is a consequence of the congestion caused by a start-date arrangement (hence
the defection problem is linked to the congestion problem discussed
above). Our description of the clinical psychology market above precisely illustrates the problem. ' -"The congestion on the start date produces pressure on parties to arrange deals in advance in order to
avoid the problems that come up on the official start date. The problem may be particularly acute when, as in the 1989-1990 law clerk
market, there ends up being no minimum time that offers must be
kept open. ' Here the market is likely to be over very quickly, and
thus a judge has reason to think that any candidate not reached very
quickly will probably be committed to someone else. Then the judge
has reason to be reluctant to make an offer to a candidate who is
likely to want to hold it for a long time (and as the earlier quotation
makes clear, a long time can be measured in minutes). Thus, in deciding to whom to make an offer, the judge has some reason to favor
candidates who have indicated a willingness to accept offers quickly.
So, in turn, candidates have an incentive to let judges know that they
129
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will accept their offers, since this makes it more likely that an offer
will be received. Indeed, in the 1989-1990 law clerk market, "[s]avvy
clerk applicants ... played their own hands. They (or sometimes their
sponsoring professors) called chambers in' 32 advance to announce that
that particular judge was the first choice."'
Yet another reason that defection is hard to control with a stage
two approach in the law clerk market is that defection will often be
difficult to detect (and hence will be relatively easy to get away with).
Often it is not public knowledge when a clerk is hired. Recall our earlier anecdote (in Table 15) about a judge asking an interviewee to
sneak in the service entrance on a Sunday. 3' Without some way of
verifying when hires were made or contacts occurred, it is difficult to
police defections from a start-date arrangement (even if enforcement
were feasible once defection had been detected).
The problem with start dates is not only that they will be undercut by defectors- although this is a problem. The problem is that
these defectors make the judiciary look bad, a concern that many
judges have voiced and that was discussed above. A system, such as
this one, that depends on honorable behavior also tends to penalize
the honorable and put honor in bad repute. As one judge said on our
survey with regard to "cartel" solutions: "All you do is create
an incen4
tive to cheat--on the part of students and judges alike."'
This sort of concern was precisely what motivated the Judicial
Conference's September 1998 abandonment of the March 1 benchmark start date for interviews. Judges who did not honor the start date
were thought by the Judicial Conference to be engaging in a public act
of lawlessness (even though there was no official "law" to be broken).'35 For similar reasons, the NCAA and the Japanese Ministry of
Labor gave up trying to regulate their respective markets; they felt
that their decisionmaking bodies were cast in a poor light by having
made rules that many were not following. '
2. Palliatives.
Could some degree of compliance be achieved if each year, at the
close of the market, all clerk candidates were surveyed, and a summary
of the year's events were circulated, indicating when first contacts were
reported, whether and when there were agreements in violation of any
start dates, and so forth? The great difficulty here would be that the re132
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Although there is no official record of this sentiment, one of us (Posner) attended the
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port would of course have to preserve student anonymity, and probably
also omit judge names (no student is going to report that Judge X, for
whom the student will be clerking, made an informal deal in advance of
the start date), and without student or judge names it seems doubtful
that the report would be very useful.
Another possible palliative would involve limiting the information available to judges prior to the start date. Making it more difficult
for judges to gather information will impede their ability to move
early, and so (for example) the strategy of asking law schools to embargo letters of recommendation until February 1, a strategy adopted
by the Judicial Conference in 1993 in connection with its establishment of a March 1 start date, 37' was a sensible way to try to reinforce
the (failed) attempt to establish a later appointment date. The fact that
just such a strategy was partially successful in the American medical
market in the 1940s gave grounds for at least cautious optimism, especially since in the medical market this strategy was effective at moving
the date of appointment back very substantially9
But the law clerk market, or at least the most competitive segment of this market, is substantially smaller than the medical market! "
In light of the size of the law clerk market, the success or failure of
any reform that depends in part on an embargo on letters of recommendation may succeed or fail based on how nearly universal compliance is achieved. Even a relatively small set of "leaks," if they systematically concern the most competitive part of the market, has the potential to defeat the intent of the embargo. And it is very difficult to
prevent all leaks. It is particularly difficult to control informal contacts
by telephone, and these appear to be common in the law clerk market.' ° Of course when other professors are offering phone
recommendations prior to the specified date, refusal by a given
professor may harm his or her own students. So the temptation to talk
to a judge who has already started gathering information about other
candidates may be considerable.
In addition, as already noted, even if defections are perfectly controlled, the start-date approach does not work well in giving parties a
chance to consider a wide range of possible transactions; the problem
of congestion will remain. And there are no palliatives for that prob-

See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 214 (cited in note 8).
See Part tIt.B.1.
139 Judge Wald notes, "Thus, in any year, out of the 400 clerk applications a judge may receive,
a few dozen will become the focus of the competition; these few will be aggressively courted by
judges from coast to coast." Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 154-55 (cited in note 2).
140 See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 219 n 36 (cited in note 8) (quoting a letter from a law school dean suggesting that in 1994 professors at other law schools communicated
with judges by phone before the authorized date).
137
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lem. As noted above, the start-date approach in the market for medical residency positions was abandoned even though there did not appear to be significant problems with defection; the reason was that the
problems with congestion were thought to be intolerable.
C. The "Monkey See, Monkey Do" Approach: Adopt the Medical
Matching System As Is
Many of the markets discussed in Part III, as well as numerous
others listed on Table 20, have progressed from stage one to stage two
to stage three, with the final move coming after the (inevitable in all
markets with which we are familiar) failure of a stage two solution. A
stage three solution involves a centralized matching system, which allows participants' preferences to be considered in an orderly way and
permits one to set the timing of the market at a desired point (say, the
third year of law school for the market for federal judicial law clerks),
as is currently the case in the market for medical residencies.
One possibility would be to adopt the medical system as is. Several commentators have urged essentially this approach for the law
clerk market. Here is a recent succinct description of the medical
match:
Each year ...

graduating physicians and other applicants inter-

view at residency programs throughout the country and then
compose and submit Rank Order Lists (ROLs) to the NRMP
[National Resident Matching Program], each indicating an applicant's preference ordering among the positions for which she has
interviewed. Similarly, the residency programs submit ROLs of
the applicants they have interviewed, along with the number of
positions they wish to fill. The NRMP processes these ROLs and
capacities to produce a matching of applicants to residency programs.

A few points bear emphasis here. First, the matching occurs after
personal interviews have been conducted. Neither residency programs
nor candidates are expected to make choices sight unseen
for what are
43
relationships in which personality certainly may matter.
Second, under the matching system participants can never gain
from submitting rankings that depart from their true preferences. In
other words, there is no possibility of gaining from ranking parties on

141 See Norris, 81 Cal L Rev at 791-98 (cited in note 72); Oberdorfer and Levy, 101 Yale L J
at 1098-1108 (cited in note 41);Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 160-63 (cited in note 2).
142 Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 748 (cited in note 9).
143 Roth, 92 J Pol Econ at 995 & n 6 (cited in note 71).
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the other side in a strategic manner based on impressions of how
those parties will be ranking the initial party."
Third, the medical match reflects purely the preferences of the
participants for pairing with one another. It does not reflect some
broader aspect of social planning or engineering by a central authority.
The match is simply a way of facilitating the parties' expression and
achievement of their preferences, an opportunity that is lacking in an
unregulated market with timing problems."
Fourth, the process is completely confidential. Neither side ever
learns how the other side ranked it.'"4 This seems critical in the clerkship context, as no student would want the judge for whom he or she
will be clerking to know that the student ranked that judge far down
on the list.
Fifth, the matching system is set up to accommodate the preferences of married couples who wish to be in the same geographic region.' It is also set up to accommodate other specialized preferences
fully below.'"4
of applicants and residency programs, as discussed more
Might the medical match approach work in the law clerk market?
1. Prognosis.
Not promising. The medical match does away with one of the central problems identified above for a stage two solution -the fact that
congestion may occur on the start date. But the problem of implied
agreements between participants as a way of getting around the strictures of the imposed agreement remains. Since judges and candidates
are permitted to meet for interviews before the match date, "offers"
and "acceptances" can be communicated well in advance of the centralized match. Just as in the situation of the market for Canadian articling positions, 14 there is nothing here to stop a judge from saying to a
candidate: "I'll rank you first in the match if you rank me first." Or
consider a judge who is more subtle, saying to a candidate:
You are my first choice. If I knew that I was your first choice, I
would just decide now to rank you first in the match. Of course, if
I am not your first choice, I need to consider other candidates,
and we won't have any mutual commitment. But if you tell me
that I am your first choice, then I will know that you will rank me

144 Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 770-72 (cited in note 9).
145

Id at 748.

146 Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 161 (cited in note 2).

See Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 758-59 (cited in note 9).
See id at 758-59 & n 8; Part IV.D.3.c.
149 See Part III.B.5.
147
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first on your form, and I'll relax now and not worry about other
candidates.
The subtext is:
Of course, I'm not asking you to make a commitment of the kind
that we're not supposed to make. That would be unethical on my
part. I just want to understand your preferences-that is part of
what I try to accomplish at an interview. Of course, only an unethical cad would mislead me about his or her preferences, so I
know that I can rely on what you tell me.
No system will work unless it makes this kind of conversation untenable.
How is this sort of problem avoided in the medical match? Certainly it is not entirely avoided; estimates suggest that 10 percent to 15
percent of students are urged to make informal commitments to residency programs prior to the match date.' However, there has not been
enough "winking" and "nodding" of this sort to bring down the system
or even weaken it in any significant way. The critical difference from the
law clerk market seems to be that informal promises are far more likely
to be binding when made to federal judges than when made to residency programs. Studies of the medical match suggest that students feel
residency programs often lie to them,'' and this may make students
more willing to violate a supposed informal understanding (since they
feel residency programs do this all the time). A key feature in the law
clerk market may be the relatively small number of judges in the relevant sector of the market. This is an interesting feature of the law clerk
context, since ordinarily smaller markets make coordination easier.
Here the small size of the market seems to make informal agreements
easier to enforce, and it is these informal but binding agreements that
present potential problems. Thus, just as the ability to make informal
agreements caused problems with the stage two solutions in the markets for college bowls, clinical psychology positions, and Japanese university graduates, this ability makes wholesale adoption of the medical

150 See Clark, 83 Georgetown L J at 1783 (cited in note 72) (reporting 1990 survey results
according to which 10.4 percent of students nationwide were pressured to make informal commitments prior to the centralized match); Richard D. Pearson and Allison H. Innes, Ensuring
Compliance with NRMP Policy, 74 Acad Med 747,747 (1999) (reporting that 15 percent of 1996
and 1997 graduates of the University of Virginia School of Medicine were asked for signals concerning what rank order list they intended to submit to the centralized match).
151 For instance, a recent study found that 33 percent of students surveyed felt that residency programs had lied to them during the process, and 58 percent of students who were told by
programs that they would be ranked highly were skeptical of the sincerity of those statements.
See Kimberly D. Anderson, Donald M. Jacobs, and Amy V Blue, Is Match Ethics an Oxymoron?
177 Am J Surgery 237,238-39 (1999).
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model in the law clerk setting-as several prior commentators have
advocated- highly problematic.

2. Palliatives.
Adopt a modified medical match. (See below.)
D. A Modified Medical Match
1. Solving the problem of informal agreements.
Since informal agreements intended to circumvent a centralized
match seem so likely to be problematic in the law clerk market, a successful centralized process would have to have a way of preventing
them. One step the Canadian articling market discussed above has
taken in response to this problem is to require students to affirm on
the form on which they submit their ranking lists that they "have not
accepted an articling position nor made a commitment to article in the
[upcoming] articling year.' '52 We propose a similar approach for the
law clerk market: each judge and each student who participates in the
centralized match should be required to certify, as a condition of participation, that no prior understanding or agreement with a student or
a judge has been reached. The idea is to make destabilizing early
agreements nonbinding.
One way in which this certification requirement would make such
agreements nonbinding is that parties on the receiving end of impermissible overtures seeking informal understandings would presumably
feel less bound to adhere to such understandings, given their explicitly
forbidden status as reflected in the certification requirement. A second, and critical, reason the certification requirement might work is
that if participants are explicitly required to certify that no informal
understanding was reached prior to the match, then a judge who attempted to engineer such an understanding would not be in a strong
position to retaliate against any student (at least in an overt manner)
who ended up not ranking the judge highly. That is, it is hard to imagine a judge complaining to colleagues, law professors, Supreme Court
Justices, or anyone else who might be in a position to influence a particular applicant's future that the applicant did not stick to an informal
understanding that the judge and candidate were explicitly required to
certify they did not make. And since students have far less power to
retaliate against judges, there seems little reason to worry about the
problem from that end.

152 See, for example, 1999 Ontario Articling Student Matching Program Student Rank Order List (on file with authors).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[68:793

Of course, each of the reasons just given also suggests that a similar sort of certification might be helpful in the context of a stage two
solution of the sort discussed above. But, as noted above, defections
are only one of the problems with a stage two solution. The other major problem, which in fact is exacerbated when defections do not occur, is congestion on the start date. This congestion prevents parties
from considering a range of options before making their decisions
and, in the medical context, led to the adoption of a stage three
mechanism apparently without substantial problems with defection.
2. The scope of the centralized process.
A critical question in the context of a centralized matching process
for the market for federal judicial law clerks would be the scope of the
match. The medical model is that all (or virtually all) employers are included. But this model would not make sense in the law clerk market, at
least as a starting point. The comprehensive model very quickly runs up
against the fact that a not insubstantial number of judges would probably be highly resistant to the idea of a centralized match. In a 1989 survey of judges, only one-third expressed support for a centralized
match"'- although a very important caveat here is that in the dozen
years since 1989 the market has experienced many more debacles and
several additional failures of attempts to impose stage two solutions,
meaning that the openness to a stage three approach might be greater.
A match of comprehensive scope also overlooks what seems to us
to be a very important feature of the law clerk market. This feature,
which emerges strongly from our judge surveys, is that there are two
groups of judges: those who are engendering the problems in the market, and the rest of the judges, who perceive no problem obtaining
qualified clerks and are not eager to be part of any "solution" to what
they do not consider to be their problem. The judges who are the source
of the problem may or may not be eager to be part of a proposed solution, but whether they are eager or not, they are in a different category,
we think, from judges who are both resistant to solutions and not the
source of the problem.
The two groups of judges differ not only in whether they are the
source of the problem, but also (and relatedly) in whether they think it
is difficult to obtain desired clerks. The first group of judges seems to
think it is difficult to obtain the clerks the judges desire, while the second does not view this as a problem. Judges Wald and Kozinski are in
the former camp,"- and the judge-author of the present Article (PosSee Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 222 (cited in note 8).
See Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1708 (cited in note 1); Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 153-55
(cited in note 2).
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ner) agrees with that point of view. Our judge surveys provide many
examples of judges in the other camp, as reflected in the comments in
Table 22.
TABLE 22
JUDGES' PERCEPTIONS OF A BIFURCATED MARKET
Survey
1999 Survey
#101c

1999 Survey #9
1999 Survey #83

1999 Survey #2

1999 Survey #4
1999 Survey #8a
1999 Survey #8b

1999 Survey #10
1999 Survey #27

1999 Survey
#30a

Comment
I have never understood the serious competition between judges for clerks. For nearly a quarter of a century, I had fine clerks, turning down dozens of applicants who would have been equally fine. Of course, I
was employing clerks-not judges!
There are far more well qualified applicants than there
are positions available in the federal system.
There are far more good candidates than clerkships.
The notion that we judges have to compete with one
another is misplaced. It's a buyer's market.
Although I do not interview, as a rule, until the winter
or spring of the year in which the law clerks start
work, I have never had any problems obtaining satisfactory law clerks.
There are plenty of able people out there.
[Tihere are plenty of good candidates.
I do not participate in the unseemly "rush" of secondyear law students (they have only one full year of
grades when they apply) for judicial clerkships. I interview in May and June of the year preceding the Court
year for which they are hired and find many qualified
candidates.
There are always excellent candidates available even
late in the year.
Even though hiring after only 3 semesters of law
school is quite early, my expertise of almost 10 years
indicates that regardless of the national strictures, I
have a plethora of excellent applicants to choose from
after the super-stars have been cherry-picked-I am
just not bothered by the "sooners," largely because I'm
not that interested in [unreadable]-hunting for #1 grad
and top 5 schools.
I do not find the system flawed. Hiring competent
clerks has not been a problem.
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TABLE 22
JUDGES' PERCEPTIONS OF A BIFURCATED MARKET
(CONTINUED)
Survey
1999 Survey #34

Comment
There are far more qualified applicants than available
positions.

1999 Survey #57
1999 Survey #68
1999 Survey #89

There are plenty of good law grads to go around.
There are a lot of smart people out there.
In the past two years I have not hired until spring of
the year they begin clerking. While the field is much
smaller, I am content that I have harvested clerks
roughly equivalent to those hired from the primary
competitive field. I have not had to lower my demanding standards.
There are plenty of well-qualified law school candidates out there.... This "competition" business is nonsense. The judges so obsessed with getting the very
best must be awfully insecure about their own abilities
and intellect!!
[C]ompetition or not, I have always been able to secure fine clerks.
I have found many qualified candidates after the
somewhat hysterical selection process undertaken by
many appellate judges in the early spring.
There are many more well-qualified candidates than
clerkships.
There are plenty of outstanding applicants. I have always been "behind the curve" in hiring but have always been able to secure wonderful people to fill these
positions!
I am disgusted by the "rat race" to hire prestigious law
clerks. I refuse to take part in it, and by doing so I have
discovered many highly qualified people -passed over
by others-who have been excellent law clerks.
There are lots of great fish in the sea. Without trying
very hard, I have gotten consistently excellent clerks,
from many different law schools.

1999 Survey #95

2000 Survey #99
2000 Survey #25

2000 Survey #47
2000 Survey
#102

2000 Survey'#91

2000 Survey #69
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TABLE 22
JUDGES' PERCEPTIONS OF A BIFURCATED MARKET
(CONTINUED)

Survey
2000 Survey #63

2000 Survey #72

1999 Survey #82

2000 Survey #83

Comment
It's a pain, mainly because there are a small number of
grotesquely aggressive judges out there who seem to
think that if they don't get x or y to clerk for them
they'll somehow suffer [irreparable] injury! They need
to chill out!
This is a "big, fancy law school" problem. If my colleagues weren't such snobs about where their clerks
come from, we'd be a lot better off.
The judges who advertised themselves to the law
schools as running farm clubs for the Supreme Court
seem to be energizing most of the competitive problems.
This is a big school, fat-headed judge problem. Go
I away and leave us alone. I'm serious.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

There are two possible explanations for the perceived limits on
the pool of top candidates in the view of the first group of judges. One
possibility is that the number of judges who perceive the need to hire
"top" candidates is large relative to the pool of such candidates. But
perhaps a more important explanation relates to the issue of Supreme
Court clerkships. Many judges want to attract applicants who will go
on to clerk at the Supreme Court, not only because of the intrinsic
value of these clerks as a result of their high ability, but also because
such applicants have instrumental value to the hiring judge in that
they make the judge more attractive to future candidates." ' The role of
Supreme Court clerkships can explain why there is always a shortage
of "best" clerks, since there is a fixed number of Supreme Court clerkships. It can also explain why many judges (those not competing to be
Supreme Court feeders) seem to think that clerk quality is not a big
issue at all.
Picking up on the role of the Supreme Court, our proposed
model for a centralized match is that participation be required for
those judges who wish their clerks to be eligible for Supreme Court
clerkships, with enforcement by the Supreme Court in a manner discussed more fully below. ' - Thus, a judge who chooses not to partici155
156

See Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 154 (cited in note 2).
One judge suggested what seems to be a similar two-tier system but as a means of en-
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pate in the centralized match cannot feed any of his or her clerks to
the Supreme Court. The judge (whether federal or state, and whether
appellate or district court level) would decide whether to participate,
and thus whether to be eligible to feed clerks to the Court. A student
would regain eligibility for a Supreme Court clerkship by clerking for
a judge who hired through the centralized match following a clerkship
with a judge who did not hire through this procedure.
Our proposed approach has several advantages relative to a centralized match of comprehensive scope. First, it would not require participation from, and cause inconvenience to, the judges who are not
the cause of any of the problems in the current market. This is a significant plus of the proposal. One of the clearest lessons from the experience in various medical markets is that the degree of participation
of employers covered by the centralized process is critical to the success of the process."' A high degree of participation seems much more
likely with the targeted approach than with a general approach embracing, for instance, all federal appellate judges. (This is not to deny
that some judges, like Judge Kozinski, will nonetheless be highly resistant to our proposal.) On the other hand, it must be recognized that
there may be some cost to requiring judges who want to hire outside
the centralized match to self-identify as nonfeeders. But our hunch
(although at this point it cannot be more than that) is that, at least insofar as federal appellate judges are concerned, only a minority would
opt out of the centralized matching process and that these judges -the
sources of the comments quoted in Table 22-do not have significant
interest in being regarded as Supreme Court feeders anyway.
A second advantage of our targeted approach is that the great
majority of judges who currently engender the "competitive problems" would almost certainly not want to opt out of the Supreme
Court feeding pool (although they might wish that they did not have
to participate in order to feed their clerks to the Court). Thus, the precise judges whose participation is most needed would be most likely to
participate, whether happily or not, in the match.
Enforcement of our proposed approach would be in the hands of
the Supreme Court. Would the Court go along? Our survey of the Justices showed essentially unanimous agreement on two points: first, the
forcing a start date for offers, not a centralized match. The judge wrote, "[I]f all the Supreme
Court Justices, or even a majority of them, announced that none of the group making the announcement would hire any law clerk who had been hired the year before in contravention of
the rule set by the Judicial Conference, this would go a long way towards obtaining enforcement
of the rule." 1999 Judge Survey #8c. As already noted, however, even if the problem of defection
from a start date is solved, the problem of congestion on the start date remains and, in the medical context, led to the adoption of a stage three approach. There are also serious problems with
detecting departures from a start date in the law clerk market.
157 See Clark, 83 Georgetown L J at 1761-65 (cited in note 72).

20011

The Market for FederalJudicial Law Clerks

current state of the market for federal judicial law clerks is a mess, and
something should be done about it; and second, there are far more
well-qualified applicants for Supreme Court clerkships than slots
available at the Court. Thus, Supreme Court Justices are concerned
about the status quo, and they would be unlikely to find it a significant
burden to limit themselves to clerks hired through the match for initial clerkships, particularly given the judges who are likely to participate in the match (as discussed just above). Fundamentally, given the
number of excellent applicants, there is little risk that a Justice would
gain much from defecting and hiring a stellar person who did not participate in the match, since it would be easy for the Justice to hire a
very good person who did participate in the match. This is not to say
that the Justices would not perceive the regime to be a restriction on
their freedom; they surely would. It is simply to say that the restriction
would be limited in comparison to the significant potential benefit
that they themselves-many of them former federal appellate
judges-seem interested in achieving for the lower federal court system.
The most obvious difficulty with our proposed noncomprehensive
model is that some judges who do not participate in the match may try
to hire fairly strong candidates before the match; these candidates
might be led to accept such offers if they are uncertain (as of course
they often would be) about their chances of getting a clerkship with one
of the "Supreme Court feeder" judges participating in the match. This
would in fact be much like the problem that comes up in the present
market; students accept offers from less preferred judges because they
do not know whether offers from more preferred judges will materialize (see Table 10 above). This is precisely the problem a centralized
match is designed to solve. So if substantial hiring did occur before the
centralized match, a more comprehensive approach might be desirable.
But the tailored approach, which recognizes the two-tier market that
many judges feel currently exists, seems to us a good place to start.
3. Attributes of a centralized process.
A number of arguments have been advanced in the existing legal
literature in support of a centralized matching process for the market
for federal judicial law clerks, and a number of objections to these arguments have been offered.e8 Although the existing debate has focused
on a comprehensive match rather than on the sort of match we propose

158 The literature here includes id at 1759-97; Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1721-24 (cited in
note 1); Norris, 81 Cal L Rev at 791-98 (cited in note 72); Oberdorfer and Levy, 101 Yale L J at
1098-1108 (cited in note 41); and Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 160-63 (cited in note 2).
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here, many of the arguments and objections are similar. Since they have
been well rehearsed, we discuss them fairly briefly.
a) Ability to consider a range of options. Most fundamentally, a

centralized clearinghouse vastly expands the parties' ability to consider a wide range of options before making their decisions. This is the
main advantage of a centralized matching system.
Some have objected to the idea of a matching system on the
ground that judges might have to conduct more interviews under such
a system.'9 This might well be true, particularly in the early years until
judges learned how many interviews they needed to conduct in order
to be sure they would fill their slots. At the same time, in light of the
number of interview cancellations under the present system (see Tables 11 and 12 above), it might well be that too few interviews are being conducted at present. Moreover, with improvements in technology
it may be that interviews can be conducted via videoconference. Already the Second Circuit is hearing a fair number of cases from upstate New York and Vermont by videoconference. A further point is
that a judge's opportunity to hire will not be limited to the match; after the match is over, a judge would be free to hire on the open market, just as occurs now in the case of medical residents.'
In any event, the cost of having to conduct additional interviews
seems to be a cost that many judges are willing to bear in exchange for
a more orderly and sensible process. Our judge survey in both 1999
and 2000 posed this question: "In general, would you favor a regime
(assumed to be fully enforceable) under which hiring occurred much
later, say in the fall of the third year, and in an orderly fashion; under
which interviews could be scheduled at a judge's convenience, without
the pressure of 'beating' other judges; but under which more interviews had to be conducted?" 74 percent of judges said "yes" in 1999;
73 percent said "yes" in 2000. So, many-although not all-judges
seem willing to bear the burden of more interviews in exchange for
the benefits that a match might bring. It also seems likely that the
judges most willing to bear the burden of more interviews are the
ones most dissatisfied and frustrated with the present system and,
thus, most likely to opt for participation in the targeted centralized
match we propose.
b) Reduced geographic bias. A matching process would also

significantly reduce the geographic bias that may arise under a stage
two solution to the unraveling problem."' Because the process would
See Clark, 83 Georgetown L J at 1766-70 (cited in note 72); Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1721
n 31 (cited in note 1).
160 Wald, 89 Mich L Rev at 161 (cited in note 2).
161 See Carl Tobias, Stuck Inside the Heartlandwith Those Coastline Clerking Blues Again,
1995 Wis L Rev 919, 923-29 (discussing the bias under a stage two approach).
159
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no longer be compressed into a very short time frame (as under a
stage two approach and, indeed, also in today's unregulated market),
judges not near major cities, where students can visit many judges in a
short span of time, would not be as disadvantaged. Also, since interviews could occur at any time, candidates might be able to visit judges
when they are in the area for other reasons. But the latter point
should not be overstated: judges might well want to interview all of
their candidates within a relatively compressed time frame, so as to be
able to make comparisons, and candidates might not want to interview
far earlier than other applicants for fear that they would be forgotten
by the time the judge got around to making decisions on rankings for
the centralized match. Thus it might be an overestimate to suggest, as
some advocates of matching systems have, that students could interview at any time convenient to them, including while flying out to interview for jobs at law firms. 62 Still, at a minimum, interviews could be
scheduled well in advance in a calm and nonchaotic manner.
Note that the same factors that suggest a reduced geographic bias
also suggest reduced travel costs, since travel could be arranged in advance. Thus, although more interviews might, all else equal, mean
higher travel costs for students,'63 all else is not equal; instead of buying
non-advance-purchase tickets in order to come on short notice, students could buy discounted tickets, which are often only a fraction of
the cost of full-fare tickets. If discounted tickets are generally onethird (say) of the cost of full-fare tickets, then students could do three
times as many trips without increasing their travel costs.
c) Balance and diversity of clerks. The biggest objection that

skeptics of a centralized match have voiced is that it interferes with
judges' ability to ensure diversity and balance across clerks.'6"ITe idea
is that the attractiveness of one clerk will depend on who his or her
co-clerks will be.
This is an important point, but there are three responses to it.
First, the argument may overstate the degree of control judges have in
the current market. When a candidate is snatched away by another
judge who has made an exploding offer, as Part II.C.l.a showed occurs
frequently at present, the first judge is limited in his or her ability to
achieve an optimally diverse and balanced mix of clerks.
Second, the fact that, as noted above, a number of judges make
offers to a pool of candidates and fill their positions with the first of-

Norris, 81 Cal L Rev at 794 (cited in note 72), offers such an argument.
See Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1721 n 31 (cited in note 1).
164 See Becker, Breyer, and Calabresi, 104 Yale L J at 221-22 (cited in note 8); Kozinski, 100
Yale L J at 1722 (cited in note 1).
162
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ferees to accept suggests that at least some judges do not regard the
composition of their clerk team as critical."
Third, and most important, the algorithm used in some matching
systems provides ways to deal with issues of diversity and balance. For
instance, the clinical psychology match allows conditions such as that
all candidates should not be from the same school. Similar conditions
apply in some of the British medical markets, where, for example, Edinburgh surgeons are able to request what they regard as an appropriate gender balance among the students with whom they are
matched.'" In general, there is no theoretical difficulty in implementing restrictions of this sort, in which some candidates are viewed as
substitutes for other candidates (for instance, candidates from the
same school). Thus, it would be easy to allow judges to say (for example) "not all positions should be filled with candidates of the same
sex."
d) Impersonal nature of the match. Another criticism that has
been offered of a centralized match is that it would undermine the
"highly personal relationship between judge and clerk."' 67 Judge Kozinski writes:
The selection process-for all its expense and pain and disappointment and hardship-is the crucible wherein the foundation
of that relationship [between judge and clerk] is forged. The time
the judge spends talking to professors and reading draft law review notes; the student's efforts devoted to reading the judge's
opinions; the time judge and clerk spend in interviews; the weighing of competing possibilities -all these help bring the parties
psychologically to the point where they are ready to make a
commitment to each other.'6
The difficulty with this argument is that all of these things would continue to happen under a matching system (interviews, talking with recommenders, clerk preparation for the interview, etc.). The only thing
that would be absent is what Judge Kozinski describes later as the
"electrifying" moment when a student says, "Yes, judge, I accept" in
person (or on the phone).16 Judge Kozinski asks, "How will the bond
between judge and clerk be affected when offer and acceptance are so
impersonal? How will the emotional content of the relationship be

See note 43 and accompanying text (describing this strategy).
See Alvin E. Roth, A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor
Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom, 81 Am
Econ Rev 415,428-29 n 26 (1991).
167 Kozinski, 100 Yale L J at 1723 (cited in note 1).
168 Id.
169 Id.
165
166
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diminished by the inherently protracted delay between interview and
computer communication?"' 70 Whatever the answers to these questions (and we doubt that the mode of offer and acceptance has much
significance in the overall nature of the judge-clerk relationship), we
would be surprised if, for most participants in the law clerk market,
this issue outweighed all of the other serious problems and inefficiencies of a stage one or stage two market. The survey evidence described
in Part II.C above certainly suggests that neither judges nor students
generally regard the current process as an auspicious beginning to the
judge-clerk relationship.
e) Changes of mind. Another issue raised by critics of a centralized match is that some candidates or judges might find their match
unacceptable in reality "even though it might have seemed acceptable
as a remote contingency far down a list of happier possibilities.' 7. This
is a concern, for saying yes to a specific offer out there (or making an
offer to a specific candidate) seems different from listing a particular
judge or candidate on a form that will be processed sometime down
the road. But this risk must be weighed against the fact that candidates change their mind in the current market as well, as a result, we
think, of the early time at which decisions must be made. For example,
a few years ago a Harvard Law School student accepted an offer with
a highly prominent D.C. Circuit judge two years ahead of the time at
which the clerkship was to begin and then, a year or so later, informed
the judge that he would not be doing the clerkship after all. With the
market occurring at a later date and in a more orderly fashion,
changes of mind on grounds of changed circumstances or changed
preferences would be far less likely.
f) Bargainingpower. One of the design questions that must be
settled in constructing a match is which side of the market "makes offers" and which side "accepts or rejects" offers. (Of course these terms
do not have their ordinary meanings in a centralized matching process,
but the concept is similar to the notion of who makes and receives offers in a decentralized market.) In most matches we know of, this issue
has been settled by appeal to the practice in the decentralized market;
thus, in a match for the law clerk market, judges would retain the initiative. Interestingly, the recent redesign of the medical match reverses
this; the match is now conducted so that medical students have the initiative, and (within the internal operation of the match algorithm)
residency programs are treated as if they accept or reject the offers (or
applications) of the students. ' But it turns out that the two ap-

170
171
172

Id at 1723-24.
Id at 1724.
See Roth and Peranson, 89 Am Econ Rev at 755-59 (cited in note 9).
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proaches yield largely similar results as a practical matter in any
event.173

4. Transition and administrative issues.
The medical match occurs in March of the last year of medical
school. Ultimately a similar sort of time frame may be desirable for the
market for federal judicial law clerks. But initially it might be best to
have the law clerk market occur earlier than the winter or spring of the
third year. The reason is that it might ease the transition. "Both the
models and the experience of the many markets that have attempted to
halt unraveling suggest that a cautious plan of attack" would be to introduce a central match "initially at an early time, when a substantial
percentage of transactions are already taking place, and then to move
the time at which the mechanism 71operates
later only after it has at4
tracted a high rate of participation.',
Having the process go early would mean that initially only the
benefits from a more orderly process, and not the benefits from later
hiring, would be achieved. But even the former benefits seem likely to
be significant, particularly from the perspective of what seems to be the
judges' primary concern, the way in which the process casts the judiciary in a negative light.
The modified match we have proposed here could be administered
by an outside firm skilled in running matches such as the medical residency matching program and the clinical psychology matching program.
Alternatively, the match could be administered by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts or some other judicially-related entity, presumably with some technical help from an outside organization.
5. Trouble signs in a modified match.
a) Movement from a stage three to a stage four market. A lesson

from the markets discussed in Part III above is that even a stage three
mechanism that is working well can on occasion be threatened by unraveling problems. One source of such problems is summer-associatetype positions that effectively amount to "prematching" in advance of
the centralized match. This is stage four in the typology described in
Part III.A.
The possibility of such "prematching" seems unlikely, however, to
bring down a centralized match, assuming it gets up and running successfully. If "prematching" were to become very significant-as in the
case discussed in Part III.B.5 above in which 80 percent of participants
173 See id at 759-60.
174 Roth and Xing, 84 Am Econ Rev at 1038 (cited in note 3).
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in a match submitted only one alternative, making it clear that everything had been settled in advance-then the centralized clearinghouse
might have to be abandoned, but this has not occurred in other markets
with centralized matches that produce stable outcomes. The situation of
80 percent prematching occurred in a match that used a nonstable
matching algorithm."5
b) Informal agreements. A separate trouble sign in a modified
match in the market for federal judicial law clerks would be the reliance
of parties on informal prematch understandings (unrelated to summerassociate-type positions) notwithstanding the certification requirement
described above. ' A possible response, if such a problem were to develop, would be the use of a small degree of randomization in the match
to destabilize the informal understandings. The somewhat speculative
randomization proposal we offer here is meant to suggest one way of
dealing with the problem of informal understandings in contravention
of the centralized match. We realize that most judges are not accustomed to thinking in explicitly statistical terms, so this proposal may
cause a certain culture shock.
Suppose that an anonymous hotline were set up to monitor compliance with the prohibition on informal understandings reflected in
the certification requirement. If this hotline showed that some threshold of noncompliance had been reached (say 1 percent of candidates,
or 1 percent of the total number of positions), then it could be announced that 5 percent (for example) of applicants would have their
first and second choices randomized in the centralized match. That is,
for 5 percent of applicants, there would be a 50 percent chance of having their second choice judge ranked as their first choice and vice
versa. (If no second choice judge was listed, the student would have a
50 percent chance of not being matched at all.) This would give these
applicants a smaller than 50 percent chance (with the precise number
depending on the preferences of both their first and second choice
judges) of consequently being matched to their second choice judge
even if their first choice judge wanted them. This would provide all
students (not just the 5 percent) with the ability to avoid any understanding that they would put Judge A first when they preferred Judge
B, since no one would know which students' choices had been randomized; a candidate could simply say to Judge A (who thought an
understanding with the candidate had been reached) that "randomization must have kicked in." It would be important not to set the
threshold number of reports required for randomization too high,
since receiving the sort of informal overture described above from a
175 See id at 1000.

176 See Part IV.D.1.
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judge might well produce sufficient excitement on the part of a clerkship candidate eager to put the process behind him or her that the
candidate would not call even an anonymous hotline.
Hopefully the threat of randomization-and the statement that
this would make about judges' behavior-would be enough to deter a
sufficiently large number of judges from reaching informal understandings that the randomization would not ever have to kick in. But
the knowledge that in any given year randomization could always kick
in would help to deter such informal understandings in the first place,
since there would be some question as to how reliable they would be.
Even in years in which randomization would actually occur, it would,
we think, probably produce fewer negative effects than the current
system (although it should be acknowledged that the negative effects
would be of a different character). Obviously the prospect of intentionally failing to put together pairs who want to be with one another
is troubling and could certainly produce perceptions of unfairness; but
so too is, and does, the current free-for-all.
CONCLUSION

The hiring process for federal judicial law clerks has engendered
intense dissatisfaction among both judges and students. Hiring occurs
earlier and earlier-now often early in the student's second year of
law school -and in a rushed, chaotic process that resembles a game of
musical chairs, in which frequently neither judges nor students make
their most desired matches. Efforts to reform the process have been
attempted over the years, with a complete lack of success.
Our study has differed from the earlier literature on this baffling
and frustrating issue in three major respects. First, we have placed the
issue within the context of economic theory that identifies the incentives and constraints, and the private and social costs and benefits, that
lead to the "unraveling" of certain markets. Second, we have situated
the law clerk market within the range of markets that have exhibited
similar problems and experienced a wide variety of attempted and
achieved solutions. And third, we have conducted a far deeper and
wider-ranging empirical survey of judge and applicant attitudes and
behaviors than any previous students of this subject.
It would be nice to be able to report that on the basis of this research effort we have come up with a clear solution to the problem.
But we have not. The problem is stubborn, intractable; this is plain as a
matter of theory and as a matter of experience in this and other markets. The solutions that have been tried and sometimes succeeded in
the other markets are unlikely to work as well in the law clerk market
because of subtle differences we have discussed.
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A mature appreciation of the recalcitrance of the world to reformers' efforts requires recognition that many social and economic
problems cannot be solved and can only be lived with. Nevertheless,
not being given to fatalism, we have suggested a partial solution,
which would require judges who wish their clerks to be eligible for
United States Supreme Court clerkships to enroll in a centralized
matching system that would, for those judges and the students applying to them for clerkships, very largely eliminate the congestion, information, and resulting mismatching problems of the present system.
More generally, we believe strongly that the Supreme Court could
play an important and productive role in helping to organize and improve the market for federal judicial law clerks. We commend our
suggested solution to the attention of the relevant decisionmakers.
But we hope that apart from its merits and any criticisms that may be
lodged against it, our study will be seen to have permanent value in
framing and illuminating a most interesting, if difficult, market problem.
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DATA APPENDIX
TABLE Al
RESPONSE RATES BY SENIORITY STATUS AND CIRCUIT-

1999 AND

2000 JUDGE SuRvEYS

Number of
judges
surveyed
1999
2000

Number of
judges
responding
1999
2000

% of surveyed
judges
responding
1999
2000

All judges

238

238

155

129

65%

54%

Active judges

161

159

103

84

64%

53%

Senior judges

77

79

51

45

66%

57%

Senior status
not listed

N/A

N/A

1

0

N/A

N/A

1st Circuit

11

10

8

7

73%

70%

2nd Circuit

20

21

9

10

45%

48%

3rd Circuit

18

19

13

13

72%

68%

4th Circuit

16

13

10

6

63%

46%

5th Circuit

20

19

9

10

45%

53%

6th Circuit

23

22

16

11

70%

50%

7th Circuit

13

15

10

9

77%

60%

8th Circuit

17

18

11

15

65%

83%

9th Circuit

40

43

27

17

68%

40%

10th Circuit

16

15

11

8

69%

53%

11th Circuit

18

17

11

8

61%

47%

D.C. Circuit

11

11

7

6

64%

55%

Federal Circuit

15

15

11

9

73%

60%

No circuit listed

N/A

N/A

2

0

N/A

N/A

Group of
federal
appellate
judges

Sources: 2 Almanac of the FederalJudiciary (Prentice Hall 1999) (1999 data on active and senior
judges); Judicial Yellow Book (Spring 2000) (2000 data on active and senior judges); 1999 and 2000
Judge Surveys (survey response rates).
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TABLE A2
THE IMPORTANCE OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE SCHOOL'S MAIN
LAW REVIEW TO JUDGES' HIRING DECISIONS

Ranking of the importance of
membership in the school's
main law reviewa

Number of
judges

Cumulative
%

1

6

5%

2

23

25%

3

11

34%

4

14

47%

5

8

53%

6

8

60%

7

7

66%

8 or belowb

7

72%

a factor, but

7

78%

25

100%

not ranked
not a factor

Total number of judges responding:116
Source: 2000 Judge Survey.
Ties in rankings were resolved by assuming that law review membership received
the higher
ranking, so if anything the data reported here overstate the importance of law review membership.
b Some judges wrote in additional selection criteria, so it
was possible for one of our eight listed
a

criteria to receive a ranking below 8.
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TABLE A3
REPRESENTATION OF STUDENTS FROM TOP LAW SCHOOLS
IN FEDERAL APPELLATE CLERKSHIPS
Institution

U.S. News &
World Report
Ranking

Number of
Law Clerks

Size of Class

Top four:

Yale
Stanford
Harvard
Chicago

192
182
552
188

Total

1114

Next six:
NYU
Columbia
Michigan
Berkeley
Virginia
Cornell
Total
Next ten:
Dukea
Northwestern
Penn
Georgetown
Texas
UCLA
USC
Vanderbilt
Minnesota
Washington & Lee
Total

443
389
356
282
363
182
2015

214
217
252
587
470
319
203
187
235
122
2796

Sources: <http://www.usnews.com/edu/beyond/gradrank/law/gdlawtl.htm> (visited Aug 17,2000)
(US. News rankings and number of J.D. students (divided by three to get class size)); Judicial
Yellow Book (Spring 2000) (law clerk data).
a Tied with Cornell.
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TABLE A4
RESPONSE RATES OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL AND BY
APPLICANT STATUS (1999 STUDENT SURVEY)

Group

Number of
students
responding

Number of respondents who
applied for federal clerkships
in 1998-1999

All seven schools
Top four schools:
Yale
Stanford
Harvard
Chicago

337

143

51
72
114
30

33
24
40
13

Total
Other schools surveyed:
Columbia
Michigan
Vanderbilt

267

110

26
13
31

13
5
15

70

33

Total
Source: 1999 Student Survey.
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TABLE A5
HIRING OF THIRD-YEAR AND POST-GRADUATE CANDIDATES

(1999-2000)
Percent of judges whose hiring of third-year students for
2001-2002 clerkships was:
Higher than
Lower than
About the same as
their level of hiring of third-year students in previous
years (94 responses total)a
Percent of judges whose hiring of post-graduates for
2001-2002 clerkships was:
Higher than
Lower than
About the same as
their level of hiring of post-graduates in previous years
(93 responses total)
Number of third-year students hired for 2001-2002
clerkships as of the date of the judge survey (106
responses total)
As a percent of total hires completed at the time of the
judge survey'
Number of post-graduates hired for 2001-2002 clerkships
as of the date of the judge survey (105 responses total)
As a percent of total hiring completed at the time of the
judge surveyb
Source: 2000 Judge Survey.
aPercentages given sum to 101 percent as a consequence of rounding.
b3 0 0 total completed hires were reported by judges responding to the survey.

10%
13%
78%

10%
13%
77%

35

12%

38

13%
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TABLE A6
JUDGES' REASONS FOR MAKING OFFERS BEFORE
COMPLETING SCHEDULED INTERVIEWS

Survey
1999 Survey #105

Judge's reason for making offers before
completing scheduled interviews
Avoid loss to other judge(s).

1999 Survey #73

Because candidates were already accepting offers elsewhere.
1999 Survey #18
Because I had to compete with other offering judges.
1999 Survey #91
Because I really liked her and everything moved so fast
this year-plus, so many were dropping out before they
interviewed with me. In any event, she took a position
with the judge she interviewed with after me -see below.
1999 Survey #106a Because I told each interviewee that I would be prepared to consider making an offer should they be
pressed by another judge and required to accept within
a specified period of time.
1999 Survey #36
Because I was pretty certain the candidate would receive an offer instanter!
1999 Survey #112b Because if I see a candidate I like I give them an offer.
1999 Survey #90
Because of the issue in the previous question [referring
to cancellations of interviews by applicants].
1999 Survey #8
Because other judges were hiring candidates away.
1999 Survey #38
Because other judges were making offers to students
that I was interviewing.
1999 Survey #42
Competition.
1999 Survey #33
Did not want to lose outstanding applicants.
1999 Survey #22
Excellent candidate I didn't want to lose.
1999 Survey #45
Excellent candidate who had other options.
1999 Survey #31
Hired one exceptionally qualified candidate on the spot
(figured she'd be gone if I waited).
1999 Survey #112 I found a good candidate and didn't want to lose
him/her.
1999 Survey #53b I had to act fast as this candidate was sure to receive
other offers in the days ahead.

1999 Survey #17

I learned from experience that if I waited to complete
all interviews before making offers quite a few applicants would withdraw.

1999 Survey #25

I thought I would lose good prospects if I didn't.
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TABLE A6
JUDGES' REASONS FOR MAKING OFFERS BEFORE
COMPLETING SCHEDULED INTERVIEWS
(CONTINUED)

Survey
1999 Survey #8d

1999 Survey #67
1999 Survey #30

Judge's reason for making offers before
completing scheduled interviews
If I liked a candidate, I made an offer at the interview.
The reason I did not want to wait until all interviews
were over was to minimize the risk of losing candidates
who would want to clerk for me.
Impression that many offers with short deadlines were
being made.
My staff consists of 4 clerks and 1 secretary. I had to recruit a whole staff (including a new secretary) in early
1999. One of my most promising applicants notified me
she had been hired by one of my colleagues in November or December 1998. Under these circumstances, I felt
that I had to accelerate my recruitment as much as possible.

1999 Survey #104 Otherwise they would be gone, based on prior years.
1999 Survey #3d Outstanding applicants who would be taken by another
judge if I did not act.
1999 Survey #82 Perceived competition from other judges.
1999 Survey #24 Pressured by a student to match an offer.
1999 Survey #187 Satisfaction with candidate, desire not to lose candidate
to another offer.

1999 Survey #18c So as to be able to compete.
1999 Survey #21 So other judges would not hire someone I really thought
highly of.

The best candidates disappear fast.
To keep from losing a good clerk to some other judge.
To prevent that applicant from being hired by someone
else before I completed interviews.
#69 A bird in the hand ....
#41 Afraid they would be hired by someone else.
#75 Applicant already had an offer.
#73 As I learned recruiting for a law firm, it is an effective
and necessary procedure.
#45 Because applicants had other offers already.
#119 Because if I see a good applicant, I want to make an of-

1999 Survey #53
1999 Survey #97
1999 Survey #99
2000 Survey
2000 Survey
2000 Survey
2000 Survey
2000 Survey
2000 Survey

fer before the person has been hired.
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TABLE A6
JUDGES' REASONS FOR MAKING OFFERS
BEFORE COMPLETING SCHEDULED INTERVIEWS
(CONTINUED)
Survey
2000 Survey #46

2000 Survey #33a
2000 Survey #28
2000 Survey #80

2000 Survey #76
2000 Survey #37

2000 Survey #114
2000 Survey #5
2000 Survey #43
2000 Survey #74a
2000 Survey #100
2000 Survey #18

Judge's reason for making offers before
completing scheduled interviews
Because the candidate was so good, I knew from experience that she would receive and probably accept another offer if I waited any longer.
Competition and pressure to finish.
Good candidate -would have accepted another offer.
I did this for the first time ever, because almost none of
the interviewees wanted to take my 2-year position, and
this excellent candidate did; plus the candidate said that
the school had instructed the students that they "had" to
take the first offer given, and the candidate was headed
immediately for additional interviews.
I started late (later than other judges) and good candidates were being hired by other judges.
If I think a candidate would be an excellent choice I like
to wrap up my efforts and leave it to the candidate. Also,
the longer the process drags on, the more likely that
someone else will make him/her an offer resulting in
nothing to show for our efforts.
Obtain clerk who was offered another clerkship.
Outstanding applicant who would be hired by another
judge if I did not act.
Rolling admission to keep from losing clearly acceptable
clerk applicant.
To avoid losing the really good applicants.
To hire a good candidate before someone else did.
To meet competition. However, at all times I had at least
two offers open.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.
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TABLE A7
STUDENT COMMENTS ABOUT THE DECISION NOT TO
APPLY-CONCERNS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE
PROCESS AND EARLY HIRING (1998-1999)
Survey
Survey #199

Comment
[The market] certainly seems like a hellish experience
and that definitely contributed to my decision not to
apply.

Survey #210

[My decision not to apply] was at least in part because
of disgust with the process.

Survey #202

I think the current system is absurd and I have yet to
hear a sufficient rationale for it. Frankly, I chose not to
apply not because I am uninterested, but because of the
process.

Survey #211

The reason I chose not to [apply] was ... I was
exhausted from fall interviews and was not ready to
begin the process again. [Also,] I had spoken with many
people about it and their tremendous frustration with
the process discouraged me.

Survey #196

Terrible market. The reason I did not apply was [that] I
was burnt out from 2L law firm interviewing and
because it forced me to decide to[o] early where I
wanted to be two years from now. And the process is a
hodgepodge lottery.

Survey #16

The biggest concern that I had was that I had to be
getting my application packets together so that they
could go out in Dec.-Jan. That meant that the more
judges I would apply to, the less time I would have to
study for finals etc.

Survey #201

[The process] was especially not attractive so soon after
the 2L summer job search.

Survey #14

[The] scheduling [of the market] (time of year when
students must apply) is tremendously inconvenient.
[This is part of the reason that] I, while theoretically
very interested, chose'not to apply. I hope too many
others weren't similarly dissuaded.

Source: 1999 Student Survey.

2001]

895

The Market for FederalJudicialLaw Clerks
TABLE A8
TIMING OF THE MARKET BY CIRCUIT
Number of judges
from circuit

Number of judges as
a % of total
responses from circuit

19981999

19992000

Started interviewing and
making offers by Jan. 31:
1st Circuit
2nd Circuit
3rd Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
6th Circuit
7th Circuit
8th Circuit
9th Circuit
10th Circuit
11th Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
Total

2
1
0
5
4
4
1
3
8
2
0
3
2
35

4
5
6
2
6
6
6
9
13
7
3
6
2
75

40%
14%
0%
71%
57%
29%
14%
33%
40%
18%
0%
43%
20%
28%

80%
63%
55%
100%
75%
75%
86%
64%
93%
88%
50%
100%
25%
71%

Done with interviews and
offers by Jan 31:
1st Circuit
2nd Circuit
3rd Circuit
4th Circuit
5th Circuit
6th Circuit
7th Circuit
8th Circuit
9th Circuit
10th Circuit
11th Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
Total

2
1
0
2
2
1
0
1
5
1
0
3
2
20

4
5
5
2
5
5
5
8
11
7
3
6
1
67

40%
14%
0%
29%
29%
7%
0%
13%
25%
9%
0%
43%
20%
16%

80%
63%
45%
100%
63%
63%
71%
57%
79%
88%
50%
100%
13%
64%

Source: 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

19981999

19992000
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TABLE A9-1
STUDENT PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE TIMING
OF THE MARKET FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW

CLERKS (1999-2000)

Survey

Comment

Survey #25

I ended up having to miss the entire last week of
classes to fly out to five or six interviews on the west
coast, arriving back the day before my first exam for
which I was entirely unable to study.... Although
I'm happy (and lucky) to have ended up with what
looks like an exciting job opportunity, I'm sure I'd
perform better at it had I been able to catch the
Establishment clause in Con law.

Survey #34

To have a shot at appellate court clerkships you
have to apply in the middle of [the student's law
school's] interviewing season. It's ridiculous that
the process is so front-loaded with lots of clerkships
awarded in October and November. 2Ls in the fall
have little by the way of writing samples and only
one year's grades.

Survey #165

Judges need to be sensitive to the fact that
travelling in December imposes enormous costs.
My fall grades reflect the fact that I did not have
adequate time to pull together the course material.

Survey #263

[T]he timing meant that some of us were
interviewing during finals .... obviously a

particularly bad time to be travelling and preparing
well for an interview.
Survey #28

Trying to apply for clerkships, do call back
interviews [with law firms], 2nd year [moot court
competition] and normal classwork was absolute
hell.

Survey #32

I couldn't postpone my interviews to study [for
exams]. I believe that I experienced adverse effects
on my performance as a result.

Source: 2000 Student Survey.
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TABLE A9-2
STUDENT PERCEPTIONS REGARDING THE TIMING
OF THE MARKET FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW
CLERKS - STATEMENTS ABOUT DIFFICULT THINGS

IN THE HIRING PROCESS (1999-2000)

Survey
Survey #17

"One of the most difficult things in the
[clerkship hiring] process was"...
Trying to schedule all of my interviews right before
finals.

Survey #19

Having to deal with the clerkship application
process so soon after the fall summer job
interviewing season.

Survey #55

Scheduling during exam period.

Survey #58

Sending out clerkship applications, deciding on
summer work and studying for finals at the same
time.

Survey #60

Juggling clerkship applications, summer job
interviews and finals.
Scheduling and attending interviews during exam
week.

Survey #165
Survey #166

Scheduling interviews on week before finals.

Survey #169

Trying to balance applications, interviews for
summer associateships,... and studying.

Survey #196

Dealing with clerkship and summer law firm
process simultaneously.

Survey #199

Ramping up ... for application in the beginning of
the 2nd year (while interviewing with firms).

Survey #206

Having to interview during finals reading period.

Source: 2000 Student Survey.
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TABLE A10
THE ROLE OF REFERENCES FROM CLASSMATES

Survey
1999 Survey
#154a

Comment
In an e-mail headed 'The Dish,' one Washington,
D.C. clerk leaked me the names of my classmates
who had made the judge's shortlist. In exchange
for the gossip, he asked me to rank my peers. It
didn't matter that I hadn't worked directly with
them and knew nothing of their writing skills. It
didn't matter that after a year and a half of law
school, I had limited experience to know what
makes a good clerk.

1999 Survey #119

On the D.C. Circuit, peer references were being
used to extend interviews and offers. I think [it's]
offensive that someone could get a desired
clerkship because she had a good friend who
made calls on her behalf.

1999 Survey #164

[A third-year student who would be clerking for
a particular D.C. Circuit judge the following
year] may have put the good word in. Judges
called 3L's in law review.

1999 Survey #122

Third year law students play an enormous role.
The clerks sort through the resumes and then
call their buddies in the class below and ask who
to interview. This was especially important when
no one had any grades in to speak of because the
process began so soon.

1999 Survey #43

A 3L friend from undergrad. at Harvard who will
be clerking for [a particular judge] ... established
contact with clerks in particular chambers.

2000 Survey #3

[A] 3L (future clerk) ... recommended me to his
future judge.

Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys.
a This response took the form of a newspaper editorial that the student had written
about the
market for federal judicial law clerks.

The Market for FederalJudicialLaw Clerks
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TABLE All
THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM FAMHIAR
PROFESSORS TO JUDGES' HIRING DECISIONS
Ranking of the importance of
recommendation from a familiar

Number of
judges

Cumulative
%

professor

or 2

49

42%

3 or 4

31

69%

5 or below,

21

87%

15

100%

1

or a factor
but not
ranked
not a factor

Total number of judges responding-116
Source: 2000 Judge Survey.
a Ties in rankings were resolved by assuming that recommendations from a familiar professor
received the higher ranking, so the data reported here may overstate the importance of such
recommendations by a small margin.
b Some judges wrote in additional selection criteria, so it was possible for one of our eight listed criteria to receive a ranking below eight.
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TABLE A12
THE ROLE OF FACULTY CLERKSHIP BROKERS
Survey
1999 Student
Survey #134

Comment
One of my professors gave me a glowing review
when the judge called him, and 15 minutes later I
got the offer.

1999 Student
Survey #116

[Professor X] definitely got me several interviews
by calling on my behalf. [Professor Y] got me at
least the [interview with a particular prominent
Eastern seaboard judge] ([that judge] told me),
and probably [another judge].

1999 Student
Survey #1

[Dean X] got me the ... interview [with a
prominent Ninth Circuit judge].

1999 Student
Survey #119

One professor basically got me an interview with
[a prominent D.C. Circuit judge].

1999 Student
Survey #9

One recommender took a very active role in the
process. I can tell because he clerked for a
particular judge who offered an interview, lobbied
the judge on my behalf, and served as a messenger
to let me know where the judge's hiring was going.
He also called to discuss how I felt about different
judges/circuits.

1999 Student
Survey #114

One of my professors really wanted me to clerk
for a particular judge. But that judge never called
me. When I accepted a state clerkship, this
professor was upset and called the judge who she
wanted me to clerk for, only to find that the reason
this judge hadn't called me was that she hadn't
started interviewing yet .... This judge now thinks
that I will reapply next year, and my guess is that
she will at least interview me.

2000 Student
Survey #37

My recommender got me many interviews I
wouldn't have gotten on my own because he was
friends with many judges.

2000 Student
Survey #167

My professor nominated the judge I interviewed
with.

The Marketfor FederalJudicialLaw Clerks
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TABLE A12
THE ROLE OF FACULTY CLERKSHIP BROKERS (CONTINUED)

Survey

Comment

2000 Student
Survey #235

I told a professor whom I'm close to that I
would very much like to interview with my 1st
choice judge. At that point, the judge had not
called me back after I told the chambers that
I'd be in his city the following week. My
professor made a call on my behalf.
Immediately after the call, the judge called to
tell me he'd be incredibly excited to see me.
After the judge's call, my professor called me
to make sure the judge called. I received my
offer at the interview. Months later, when my
judge sent a letter to all his 2001-2002 clerks
describing the other clerks, he pretty much
wrote in my description that he trusted "his
friend" (my professor).

2000 Student
Survey #266

One of my professors called the judge I will be
clerking for and played an integral role in my
getting the interview and clerkship.

2000 Student
Survey #252

[The] dean of [the student's] law school, good
friends with [a particular] judge, called him on
my behalf.

2000 Student
Survey #209

[V]arious [faculty from the student's school]
played enormous roles getting me interviews
with the three judges I applied to.

2000 Student
Survey #165

[O]ne of my recommenders carried
considerable weight with several judges. I was
told several times that her name and
recommendation secured my interview.

2000 Student
Survey #8

A professor called to get me an interview
despite the fact that all interviews had been
filled.

1999 Judge Survey
#52

[I] delegate[ ] [hiring] to [the] Clerkship
Committee at a Law School.
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TABLE A12
THE ROLE OF FACULTY CLERKSHIP BROKERS (CONTINUED)

Survey

Comment

1999 Judge Survey
#61

I always take (or almost always) one law clerk
from Harvard, recommended by my classmate,
[Professor Z].
[I have an] arrangement w[ith] [a] law school: 1
hire people we mutually agree on: The
interview is a formality ([and] sometimes I hire
w[ithout] interviews).
[A]t least one of my clerks is, in effect, picked
by a certain law professor.

1999 Judge Survey
#52

2000 Judge Survey
#70

Source: 1999 and 2000 Student Surveys; 1999 and 2000 Judge Surveys.

